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Abstract: A number of ways of taxonomizing human learning have been proposed. We examine the evidence for one such proposal,
namely, that there exist independent explicit and implicit learning systems. This combines two further distinctions, (1) between
learning that takes place with versus without concurrent awareness, and (2) between learning that involves the encoding of instances
(or fragments) versus the induction of abstract rules or hypotheses. Implicit learning is assumed to involve unconscious rule learning.
We examine the evidence for implicit learning derived from subliminal learning, conditioning, artificial grammar learning,
instrumental learning, and reaction times in sequence learning. We conclude that unconscious learning has not been satisfactorily
established in any of these areas. The assumption that learning in some of these tasks (e.g., artificial grammar learning) is
predominantly based on rule abstraction is questionable. When subjects cannot report the "implicitly learned" rules that govern
stimulus selection, this is often because their knowledge consists of instances or fragments of the training stimuli rather than rules. In
contrast to the distinction between conscious and unconscious learning, the distinction between instance and rule learning is a sound
and meaningful way of taxonomizing human learning. We discuss various computational models of these two forms of learning.
Keywords: artificial grammar; categorization; connectionism; consciousness; explicit/implicit processes; instances; learning; mem-
ory; rules
1. Introduction
A classic issue faced by researchers attempting to under-
stand the basic laws of learning is whether there is more
than one basic learning mechanism. Can all the phenom-
ena of learning be accommodated by a unitary mecha-
nism, or do we need to posit the existence of independent
and dissociable human learning systems? In this target
article we consider some of the experimental evidence -
much of it very recent - that has addressed this issue.
We will consider two dimensions on which it has been
suggested that functionally distinct learning systems dif-
fer. The first dimension concerns the role of awareness
during learning. Many authors (e.g., Hayes & Broadbent
1988; Lewicki et al. 1987; Reber 1989a) have argued that
in addition to having a learning system whose functioning
is accompanied by concurrent awareness of what is being
learned, humans have a quite separate system that oper-
ates independently of awareness. The second dimension,
which turns out to be closely related to the first, concerns
the content of learning. Distinct learning systems encode
very different sorts of information; one system induces
rules (e.g., Lea & Simon 1979; Nosofsky et al. 1989),
whereas a second system memorizes instances (e.g.,
Brooks 1978; Medin & Schaffer 1978).
We believe it is important to evaluate the current
evidence for and against the multiple-systems view for at
least two reasons. First, each of the separate systems that
has been hypothesized has tended to encourage re-
searchers to develop a set of explanatory constructs that
are unique to that system and that allow its characteristic
phenomena to be explained. A drawback, however, is that
experimental results are often interpreted exclusively in
terms of these restricted concepts, with no consideration
of whether they might also be understood (and possibly
better understood) in terms of more general principles.
The second and perhaps more pressing reason for
evaluating the evidence for dissociable learning systems
is that there has been considerable interest, over the last
few years, in whether there exist dissociable memory
systems (for reviews, see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork
1988; Schacter 1987; 1989; Squire 1992). The mounting
positive evidence comes from a variety of sources. For
example, amnesic patients have been shown to be dra-
matically impaired on certain direct tests of memory, such
as free recall, but less impaired or even unimpaired on
indirect tests of memory, such as motor skills (see Squire
1992). Although dissociations between performance on
direct and indirect tests do not force us to conclude that
there are dissociable memory systems (e.g., Jacoby &
Kelley 1991; Roediger 1990), some researchers have ar-
gued at length that the experimental results, together
with current understanding of brain functioning, strongly
imply the existence of separable underlying systems
(e.g., Schacter 1989; Squire 1992).
Few would argue that learning and memory can be
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studied independently. On the contrary, the possible
characteristics of dissociable learning systems should be
considered in research on the issue of dissociable memory
systems and vice versa. Indeed, if there really are disso-
ciable memory systems, it seems very likely that there are
also dissociable learning systems that supply them with
information. Yet, as several authors have noted (e.g.,
Berry & Dienes 1991; Reber 1989a), research on learning
and on memory has tended to proceed independently. We
hope to help memory researchers in their attempts to
understand information storage and retrieval by examin-
ing carefully the question of whether distinct learning
systems exist and by analyzing the properties of the
learning mechanisms that acquire information.
1.1. Proposed distinctions between types of learning
Distinctions between different types of learning have
been common in psychology for many years. One such
distinction is between declarative and procedural learn-
ing, that is, between the acquisition of factual knowledge
and the acquisition of skills, respectively (e.g., Cohen &
Squire 1980; Morris 1984; Winograd 1975). Other distinc-
tions include the acquisition of "habits" versus "memo-
ries" (Mishkin et al. 1984) and "taxon" versus "locale"
learning (O'Keefe & Nadel 1978). Of course, if indepen-
dent memory systems require independent learning
mechanisms, then many more distinctions might be
needed. For instance, we might require separate learning
systems to feed semantic and episodic memory stores
(Neely 1989; Tulving 1983; see also multiple book review:
BBS 7(2) 1984).
Of these distinctions, the one between declarative and
procedural learning has probably attracted the most at-
tention, with a variety of empirical phenomena being
interpreted in that framework. For example, Cohen and
Squire (1980) suggested that amnesics have normal or
near-normal procedural learning but impaired declarative
learning, a theoretical notion that has been widely taken
up by other researchers in the amnesia field. This distinc-
tion has in recent years been largely eclipsed, however,
by the alternative distinction between "explicit" and "im-
plicit" learning. (Note that some authors have replaced
the original declarative/procedural distinction with the
terms "declarative" and "nondeclarative" [e.g., Shim-
amura & Squire 1989; Squire 1992].) The main reason for
the shift in terminology and emphasis toward the terms
"explicit" and "implicit" is dissatisfaction with the original
terminology, the term "procedural" apparently being too
narrow to encompass the relevant learning effects. For
example, the learning that is preserved in amnesia is not
always of a procedural nature: it includes a variety of
priming effects involving, for instance, the ability to
complete word steins (Graf et al. 1984) and an increase in
the likelihood of judging a nonfamous name famous as a
result of prior exposure (e.g., Squire & McKee 1992).
The term "implicit learning" was first coined by Reber
(1967), who is responsible for much of the recent interest
in the issue of distinct learning systems (see Reber 1989a
for a review). Different authors have used a variety of
definitions to capture the fine detail of the explicit/
implicit learning distinction (see Mathews et al. 1989, for
examples), but the key factor is the idea that implicit
learning occurs without concurrent awareness of what is
being learned and represents a separate system from the
one that operates in more typical learning situations,
where learning does proceed with concurrent awareness
(i.e., explicitly). At the same time, it is clear that many
authors have been concerned with the possibility that
different learning tasks might give rise to different kinds
of knowledge (e.g., Mathews et al. 1989; Reber 1989a;
Vokey & Brooks 1992), one kind abstract or rule based and
the other based on separate fragments or instances. For
Reber, implicit learning is not only unconscious but also'
involves the acquisition of abstract information.
The paradigm case is language learning, where people
are assumed to be able implicitly to learn abstract gram-
matical rules. Few nonlinguists are aware of or are able to
articulate the grammatical rules supposed to underlie
their linguistic performance, so it makes sense to imagine
that those rules are acquired, if at all, without ever being
directly represented in consciousness. The rules are ab-
stract in the sense that they apply equally to any linguistic
tokens, including novel ones, that come from the appro-
priate syntactic categories.
Because the aware/unaware and rules/instances di-
mensions are logically distinct, we believe that they must
be treated independently, in this target article we accord-
ingly review evidence for these two dimensions sepa-
rately. In what follows, we reserve the term "unconscious
learning" for learning without awareness, regardless of
what sort of knowledge is being acquired. At the same
time, we use the terms "rule learning" and "instance
learning" to refer to the acquisition of abstract and frag-
mentary knowledge, respectively, regardless of whether
such learning is conscious.
Most of the article is devoted to whether unconscious
learning is indeed supported by empirical evidence. In
section 2 we survey a wide range of learning paradigms,
from subliminal learning phenomena to Pavlovian condi-
tioning to artificial grammar learning and serial reaction-
time tasks. The stimuli and specific processes involved in
performing and learning each of these tasks differ widely
and may share some basic characteristics or may exhibit
some basic differences. Across these diverse paradigms
we find little actual support for unconscious rule induc-
tion (i.e., for implicit learning), or for the unconscious
learning of any other type of information. However, in
section 3 we do find evidence for a dissociation between a
rule-induction system and an instance-memorization sys-
tem; we review evidence for this dissociation obtained in
explicit, or conscious, learning tasks. Within each system,
the range of different processes and information is still
large, but they nevertheless seem to form two distinct
types: slow, effortful hypothesis testing on the one hand,
and fast, efficient memorization of instances and frag-
ments of instances on the other.
We concentrate throughout on data from normal sub-
jects. It is clear, however, that amnesic patients have
learning difficulties, and these difficulties have been
widely interpreted within the explicit/implicit framework
(e.g., Squire 1992). For our present purposes, the data
from such subjects are tangential, because the question of
awareness during learning has not been directly consid-
ered in amnesics (but see Knopman 1991). In section 4 we
comment briefly on the interpretation of learning data
from this population of subjects.
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2. Can learning occur without awareness?
Proponents of the explicit/implicit distinction have ar-
gued that there are clear demonstrations of subjects'
ability to encode new information without being aware of
that information, and hence that awareness is the key
dimension on which separable learning systems differ.
The question of whether learning can occur without
awareness goes back many decades (e.g., Adams 1957;
Dulany 1961; Eriksen 1960; Krasner 1958; Thorndike &
Rock 1934). In addition to the recent work of Reber, which
we consider below, in the last five or six years there have
been a large number of sequence learning reaction time
studies that have adopted an interesting and novel tech-
nique for assessing the relationship between aware-
ness and learning. A substantial part of our review
concerns results obtained using this task. We also con-
sider evidence from a variety of conditioning proce-
dures. We begin with some comments on experimental
methodology.
2.1. The logic of dissociations
Almost all studies of unconscious learning have adopted a
very constrained version of the logic of dissociation.
Separate indices of learning and awareness are used in the
attempt to find circumstances in which exposure to a set of
stimuli leads to detectable learning unaccompanied by
any reliable degree of awareness. On the face of it, such an
approach could lead to unequivocal evidence of uncon-
scious learning, but researchers using similar logic to try
to establish the existence of unconscious perception have
noted several problems (e.g., Reingold & Merikle 1988).
What counts as a suitable test of awareness? Can we
discount the possibility that our index of awareness is
contaminated by unconscious information? Can we be
sure it is sufficiently sensitive to detect exhaustively all
conscious information? As we shall see, these are deep
problems, and researchers have adopted a variety of
strategies to try to circumvent them.
Firmer evidence for unconscious learning may emerge
from experiments based on alternatives to this particular
dissociation paradigm. To test unconscious perception,
for example, Reingold and Merikle (1988) have proposed
a new and interesting procedure, whereby one looks for
greater sensitivity to some variable in an indirect test in
which instructions make no reference to the variable as
compared with an otherwise identical direct test in which
the instructions do refer to the variable. Alternatively,
one could try to demonstrate the independence of two
learning systems by trying to establish qualitative differ-
ences between them (e.g., Merikle & Reingold 1992),
such that, for example, one system is affected in one way
by a variable, the other in the opposite way.
We know of only one study that has even come close to
establishing such qualitative differences; this case will
accordingly be considered in some detail. Hayes and
Broadbent (1988) began by postulating two independent
systems: an unconscious system that would slowly accu-
mulate information about predictive events in the envi-
ronment and a conscious system that would test hypoth-
eses. They further assumed that the conscious system
would be highly dependent on a limited-capacity working
memory system, and the unconscious system would be
independent of it. [See also Broadbent: "The Maltese
Cross" BBS 7(1) 1984.]
A rather straightforward prediction emerges from this
plausible model of the cognitive system. Because the
conscious learning mechanism relies on working memory,
there should be situations where learning is profoundly
affected by loading the working memory system with a
secondary task, such as generating random numbers. At
the same time, because the unconscious system does not
depend on working memory, other (implicit) learning
tasks should be unaffected by such a secondary task.
Indeed, Hayes and Broadbent went so far as to say that
unconscious learning might be facilitated by a secondary
task if it prevented the conscious system from exerting an
interfering influence on the unconscious system. The
importance of the Hayes and Broadbent study is that, in
accordance with their model, they appeared to have
found two learning tasks that differed in only a minor way,
one of which was inhibited and the other facilitated by a
secondary task.
In their experiments Hayes and Broadbent contrasted
performance in two versions of the computer "person"
task. On each trial, the subject entered an attitude (e.g.,
polite) into the computer, which then responded with its
attitude (e.g., unfriendly). The subject's task was to try to
get the computer to be friendly. If we designate the 12
possible attitudes - going from very unfriendly to loving -
with the numbers 1 . . . 12, then the computer's attitude
on each trial was a simple numerical function of the
subject's input. In one (No-Lag) condition, the computer's
attitude (O() on each trial was a function of the subject's
attitude (I,) on the same trial:
O, = I, - 2 + r (1)
where r is a random number (—1, 0, or l)and the attitudes
have the 12 numerical values mentioned above. In the
other (Lag) condition, I, was replaced by l,_u so that the
computer's attitude was determined by the subject's atti-
tude on the preceding trial:
O, = I,_; - 2 + r (2)
Performance was measured in terms of the number of
trials in which the subject's input was one that could
(given the random element) have produced a friendly
response from the computer person. Although learning
occurred in both groups, Hayes and Broadbent found that
subjects could give highly accurate verbal reports about
the No-Lag task, indicating that their learning had been
accompanied by awareness, whereas the verbal reports of
subjects in the Lag version were very poor. This result
encourages the view that learning in the No-Lag task can
be readily achieved by the explicit system, but that the
Lag task requires the implicit system. Thus we might
predict that a concurrent secondary task would have an
effect on learning in the No-Lag condition but not in the
Lag condition.
To test this, Hayes and Broadbent (1988) gave subjects a
block of learning trials using either Equation 1 (No-Lag
group) or Equation 2 (Lag group). After 30 trials in the No-
Lag condition and 50 trials in the Lag condition, perfor-
mance was approximately equated, and at this point
Hayes and Broadbent changed the rules by replacing the
- 2 in the equations with +2. They then presented a
further 30 (No-Lag group) or 50 (Lag group) relearning
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trials. Under single-task conditions (Experiment 1), per-
formance in the Lag condition was affected more detri-
mentally than in the No-Lag condition by this rule
change. In contrast, when subjects were required to
perform a concurrent secondary task (generating random
letters or digits; Experiments 2 and 3), a change in the
rule interfered more with performance in the No-Lag
than in the Lag task, exactly the opposite of the result
obtained when there was no secondary task. The results
conform to Hayes and Broadbent's theory - and hence to
their conception of separate implicit and explicit learning
systems - if we simply assume that the secondary task
occupied the conscious working memory system and
therefore interfered with the explicit system, whereas
removal of the working memory system allowed the im-
plicit system to operate without any interfering influence
from the explicit system.
Unfortunately, Green and Shanks (1993) were unable
to replicate Hayes and Broadbent's results. In the single-
task groups, Green and Shanks found that the introduc-
tion of the equation change had similar effects on perfor-
mance in the No-Lag and Lag groups, thus failing to
replicate Hayes and Broadbent's (Experiment 1) finding
that performance was more detrimentally affected in the
Lag condition. Under dual-task conditions the situation
was the same: performance was approximately equally
affected in the two groups. There was not the slightest
hint that performance in the Lag group was less affected
by the equation change, and hence Hayes and Broad-
bent's (Experiment 2 and 3) dual-task results were like-
wise not replicated. Green and Shanks suggest that Hayes
and Broadbent may have obtained the results they did
owing to the inappropriate inclusion of subjects who had
learned very little prior to the equation change.
Hayes and Broadbent's dissociation posed a genuine
problem for theories of learning relying on a single learn-
ing mechanism. Because the secondary task appeared to
have opposing effects on the two primary tasks, Hayes and
Broadbent's data seemed to support the claim that there
exist dissociable learning systems. Obviously, the fact that
their results could not be replicated undermines those
conclusions.
With the exception of Hayes and Broadbent's study,
implicit learning experiments have universally adopted
the dissociation logic of attempting to demonstrate learn-
ing in the absence of any detectable degree of awareness.
As we shall see, various methodological problems with
the dissociation procedure make it doubtful whether
unconscious learning has yet been established. It is worth
bearing in mind, however, that future experiments using
alternative methods may license stronger inferences con-
cerning the dissociability of learning systems. We now
begin our discussion of the empirical evidence.
2.2. Unconscious learning with subliminal stimuli
Most studies of unconscious learning have asked whether
people can learn about relationships between stimuli
without being aware of those relationships, but before
discussing the results of such studies we will briefly
consider evidence from experiments asking a more direct
question, Can people learn about stimuli when they are
unaware of the existence of these stimuli, that is, when
the stimuli are subliminal? A situation in which uncon-
scious learning would, on the face of it, be fairly straight-
forward to establish is one in which a subject is entirely
unaware that the critical stimulus in the learning phase is
present at all, yet still shows evidence of leaning some-
thing about that stimulus.
There have, of course, been a large number of experi-
ments in which subjects are presented with brief or low-
intensity stimuli intended to be below the threshold of
awareness and in which an attempt is made to measure
effects of such stimulation on subsequent behavior. We
ignore much of this literature, for two reasons: first, in
some cases such effects may be only tenuously related to
learning. For example, many subliminal activation exper-
iments ask whether the way a stimulus is interpreted may
be biased by a supposedly subliminal stimulus presented
a few hundred milliseconds previously • (e.g., Marcel
1983). It is doubtful, .however, that such biasing effects
would occur over longer intervals: instead, they are typ-
ically interpreted as examples of some sort of short-lived
facilitation. Needless to say, it is difficult to draw a sharp
line between perception and learning, but if unconscious
learning is to have any real significance, it must be
demonstrable over reasonable intervals of time (at the
very least seconds or minutes rather than milliseconds).
Second, many subliminal activation experiments that
do appear to show longer-lasting effects (e.g., Eich
1984) have already been the subject of extensive criticism
in this journal (see Holender 1986, and accompanying
commentaries). We have no wish to repeat arguments
made previously except to point out that in such experi-
ments it is extremely difficult to be confident that the
stimuli are indeed below the threshold of conscious per-
ception.
We accordingly focus in this section on studies that
avoid these problems. Andrade (in press), Bornstein
(1992), Ghoneim and Block (1992), Greenwald (1992), and
Schacter (1987) review a number of relevant studies
examining learning with subliminal stimuli. Although
there have been some positive results, a corresponding
number of negative findings leads us to suggest that
unconscious learning with subliminal stimuli has not yet
been conclusively demonstrated.
Subliminal stimuli may be presented to awake subjects
as auditory messages at extremely low intensity or in
some scrambled form, or as images presented for very
brief durations or embedded in other figures; alter-
natively, they may be presented to subjects during sleep
or anesthesia. There is a widespread popular belief in the
ability of such subliminal messages to condition attitudes
or preferences or otherwise to influence behavior. In-
deed, this belief is so powerful that the families of two
young men who died from self-inflicted gunshot wounds
sought more than $6 million in damages from the rock
group Judas Priest on the grounds that subliminal mes-
sages on one of the group's records had caused the men to
commit suicide (see Loftus & Klinger 1992). Recent
investigations, however, suggest that the concern is mis-
placed. Controlled experiments attempting to see
whether subliminal messages can influence behavior or
whether people can use self-help audiotapes as learning
aids have yielded exclusively negative results (British
Psychological Society 1992; Greenwald et al. 1991; Vokey
& Read 1985). It seems unlikely that unconscious learning
can occur in such situations.
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Several investigations of spared cognitive functions
under general anesthesia have obtained evidence of small
but reliable amounts of learning, but these are matched
by a comparable number of negative results (see An-
drade, in press; Ghoneim & Block, 1992, for reviews). If
the anesthetic has been adequately administered and
renders the patient entirely unconscious, then spared
learning must in turn be unconscious. A typical positive
result was reported by Jelicic et al. (1992). They gave
anesthetized patients repeated auditory presentations of
two words (e.g., yellow, green) from a semantic category.
Later, when the anesthetic had worn off, subjects were
asked in a priming test to generate members of those
categories. Subjects were significantly more likely to
produce the preexposed words than were control subjects
who had not been read the words during anesthesia. Thus
some information does seem to have been encoded while
the subjects were unconscious.
Another positive result was reported by Kihlstrom et
al. (1990). They gave anesthetized patients lists of strongly
associated cue-target word pairs, with each list being
presented about 67 times during the operation. Later,
when the anesthetic had worn off, subjects were given a
cued recall and a recognition memory test; in a third test,
they were read the cue words and had to say the first word
that came to mind. Although the recall and recognition
tests yielded no evidence of retention, on the generation
test subjects were more likely to produce target items to
preexposed cue words than to nonpreexposed cue words,
whether the test was relatively soon after the exposure
phase (median 87 min) or much later (median 14 days).
Thus, again, some degree of unconscious registration
seems to have occurred.
In contrast to this are the many negative results that
have been published. Some of these are particularly
revealing because they come from experiments using
procedures very similar to those of studies that have found
positive results. For example, Cork et al. (1992) failed to
replicate the Kihlstrom et al. (1990) results using a differ-
ent anesthetic but otherwise identical procedures. Fur-
thermore, despite the likelihood that sleep renders a
person less unconscious than general anesthesia, in a
well-controlled experiment Wood et al. (1992) were un-
able to obtain evidence of learning during sleep, again
with procedures similar to those used in the Kihlstrom et
al. (1990) study. Similarly, Ghoneim et al. (1992) found no
evidence of Pavlovian conditioning in anesthetized pa-
tients; they used experimental procedures that did reveal
conditioning in nonanesthetized subjects.
This pattern of results might simply indicate that learn-
ing under anesthesia is a genuine phenomenon, but that
relatively subtle methodological factors determine
whether a given study will or will not obtain evidence of
it. However, Andrade (in press) discusses a large number
of studies, including over 20 published reports of failures,
and is unable to find any clear factors that determine
whether learning will or will not occur. For example, it
does not seem to be especially related to the type of
stimuli used. More significantly, it remains an open possi-
bility that many positive results have been due to inade-
quately administered anesthetic that left some or all of the
patients at least partially conscious. It is worth noting that
in the Cork et al. (1992) study three subjects were ex-
cluded from the analysis because they had explicit mem-
ory of the study items! As Cork et al. say, "the extent to
which implicit expressions of memory are affected by
general anesthesia remains uncertain" (p. 897).
2.2.1. Conclusions. Experiments in which subjects are
presented with stimuli that they are likely to be unaware
of at the time of exposure yield some evidence of uncon-
scious learning, but this is offset by a substantial body of
negative evidence. At present, it would be premature to
conclude from the available studies that unconscious
learning is feasible.
2.3. Criteria for establishing unconscious learning with
supraliminal stimuli
In the rest of this section we focus on situations where the
stimuli are above the threshold for detection and identi-
fication. In such situations, subjects may be unaware of
the relationships between stimuli even though they are
aware of the stimuli themselves. Learning of inter-
stimulus relationships may therefore be unconscious.
We argue that just about all unconscious learning ex-
periments with supraliminal stimuli can be conceptually
reduced to the arrangement shown in Figure 1. The
figure illustrates an associative learning episode in which
subjects have the opportunity to learn that two events, A
and B, stand in a predictive relationship. Event A might
be a tone conditioned stimulus (CS) and event B a shock
unconditioned stimulus (US); the measure of learning
might be a galvanic skin response (GSR) at time t2 when
the CS is presented again. Or event A might be a feature
or set of features, event B might be a category, and the
measure of learning might be the probability of making
the category response at t2- We are interested in whether
subjects can learn the predictive relationship in the ab-
sence of concurrent awareness of that relationship. We
assume for the sake of simplicity that there is just one
learning trial.
Learning itself presumably takes place during or after
presentation of event B; we wish to ascertain the subject's
state of awareness during this learning episode. Unfor-
tunately, there are likely to be profound technical diffi-
culties in assessing awareness of a predictive relationship
at just the moment learning itself occurs. Apart from
anything else, asking subjects at time tt whether they are
aware of the relationship between stimuli A and B is likely
to direct their attention to that relationship. As an illustra-
tion, in a study by Baeyens et al. (1990a) that will be
discussed in more detail later, the proportion of A-B
relationships which the subjects appeared to be aware of
on a postconditioning recognition test increased from
18% to 77% when subjects also gave concurrent estimates
of awareness during the learning stage. Clearly, the con-
current index of awareness directed subjects' attention to
the relationship and affected the very entity it was de-
signed to measure.
Hence, we will usually have to settle for assessing
awareness after the target learning trial. At this time (t2 in
Fig. 1), suppose we present event A (a tone previously
paired with shock) and measure the GSR as well as asking
subjects whether they have any particular expectancy of
event B. If we obtain a GSR but no evidence of a conscious
expectancy of event B, we have obtained the crucial
finding that lies at the heart of all attempts to demonstrate
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B
Implicit measure
e.g., GSR, classification response, etc.
Learning
Time
Measure of conscious knowledge reveals:
(i) Awareness of study
episode
(ii) Awareness of A-B
relationship
(iii) No relevant awareness
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of events in experiments that investigate the role of awareness in the learning of predictive
relationships. Subjects witness a predictive relationship between stimuli A and B, with learning presumed to occur during the
interval marked tx. At some time later (f2) stimulus A is presented again. Performance at t2 is taken as an index of learning at tit
whereas a concurrent measure of awareness at t2 is used to infer the content of the subject's awareness at tv
implicit learning with supraliminal stimuli. For if subjects
have no expectancy of event B at t2, we have some basis for
inferring that they were not aware of the A-B relationship
at tv
This might seem to be a very strong inference, but we
believe such inferences will have to be accepted if uncon-
scious learning is to be established. It is unavoidably dif-
ficult to assess awareness concurrently with learning, so
one is forced to rely on some later test. Of course, we also
make a backward inference concerning learning itself: if
performance at time t2 is no better than we would expect
by chance, we often infer that learning did not occur at tt.
Conversely, if performance is better at t2 than we would
expect by chance, we conclude that learning did occur.
2.3.1. The relationship between unconscious learning
and implicit memory. The basic design shown in Figure 1
allows us to see the intimate relationship between uncon-
scious learning and implicit retrieval: demonstrations of
unconscious learning are a proper subset of the larger set
of demonstrations of implicit retrieval.
Implicit retrieval is defined as occurring when informa-
tion from some prior episode can be retrieved and can
hence influence current processing, but in the absence of
conscious recollection of that prior episode (e.g., Schacter
1987; we use the term "implicit retrieval" rather than the
more common term "implicit memory" to emphasize that
we are specifically considering what happens during the
retrieval process). Thus, implicit retrieval requires the
absence of a conscious reexperience of the study episode.
Now, lack of awareness of a contingency at t2 presumably
means the absence of any consciously recallable episodic
memory traces in which that contingency is embedded,
and hence any piece of evidence that allows us to infer
unconscious learning must also be an example of implicit
retrieval: this is case (iii) shown in Figure 1. The converse
does not hold, however; an example of implicit retrieval
does not necessarily represent evidence of unconscious
learning.
Suppose that a subject emits a GSR when presented at
test with a tone stimulus. There are three possible sce-
narios, shown in Figure 1:
1. The subject remembers the study episode, in which
case the GSR response does not count as an example of
implicit retrieval according to Schacter's (1987) definition.
Because remembering the episode entails remembering
the content of that episode (i.e., the A-B contingency),
the learning could not have been implicit either.
2. The subject does not remember the study episode,
but is aware - that is, has semantic knowledge - that this
tone predicts shock (cf. source amnesia). Although this
qualifies as a case of implicit retrieval, we would not infer
that learning itself had been unconscious, since at t2 the
subject is aware that A predicts B. (Note that this ignores
the possibility that subjects could have been unaware of
the A-B relationship at tx, but aware of it at t2, for
example, as a result of observing their own behavior.
Observation of a GSR in response to the tone might lead
the subject to believe that the tone must therefore predict
shock. How one might exclude this possibility is a difficult
question.)
3. The subject neither remembers the study episode
nor has conscious semantic knowledge of the A-B rela-
tionship. This final case again qualifies as implicit re-
trieval. More important, we now have evidence that is
relevant to unconscious learning, as lack of awareness of
the relationship at retrieval licenses the inference that
learning too took place without awareness.
Thus, in order for us to infer unconscious learning from
implicit retrieval, the subject must be unaware of the
relevant relationship that occurred in the study episode,
in addition to being unaware of the episode itself. In
summary, an unconscious learning experiment just is an
implicit retrieval experiment, but with the added compo-
nent of meeting this further condition. For researchers in
the field of implicit retrieval, all that is of interest is
whether the subject is unaware of the relevant study
episode, as in cases (ii) and (iii). But only case (iii) is
relevant to the question of unconscious learning; the
subject must also be unaware of the relationship that
372 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1994) 17:3
Shanks & St. John: Dissociable learning systems
occurred in that episode. It is for this reason, we argue,
that much of the data obtained from amnesics is irrelevant
to the question of unconscious learning (see sect. 4).
2.3.2. Dissociation of task performance and verbal re-
ports. Within the dissociation paradigm (Reingold &
Merikle 1988), many studies have shown that subjects can
acquire information without being able to report it ver-
bally at a later time. Such findings have been taken as
support of the claim of unconscious learning. Suppose
that subjects are presented with some information at time
tj and that a subsequent performance test indicates they
have encoded this information. We argue that if the aim is
to establish what the subjects' state of awareness was at tu
examining the content of their verbal reports at t2 is
certainly not the only way to do this and may not be the
best one.
To illustrate this, note that the condition mentioned
above (that the backwards inference must be valid) can be
made more specific by dividing it into two further criteria.
The first concerns the match between the information
responsible for performance changes and the information
revealed by the test of awareness. We call this the Infor-
mation Criterion. The second criterion concerns the
sensitivity of the test for awareness. We call this the
Sensitivity Criterion.
Information Criterion: Before concluding that subjects
are unaware of the information that they have learned
and that is influencing their behavior, it must be pos-
sible to establish that the information the experimenter
is looking for in the awareness test is indeed the
information responsible for performance changes.
This criterion is intended to exclude situations such as the
following: suppose the experimenter sets up a task in
which performance can be improved if the subjects learn
information 7. Performance does indeed improve, and
subjects are apparently unaware at time t2 that they have
learned /. However, an adequate explanation of the im-
provement in performance is that subjects are not learn-
ing /, but 7*. By the experimenter's criteria, awareness of
7* would be disregarded as irrelevant, and so the experi-
menter would erroneously conclude that the subjects'
performance was under the control of some information
or knowledge of which they were unaware. The Informa-
tion Criterion is closely related to the notion of "corre-
lated hypotheses" introduced by Adams (1957) and Du-
lany (1961) and which will be discussed in section 2.6.1.
Our second criterion is far from new (e.g., Brewer
1974; Brody 1989; Dawson & Schell 1985; Ericsson &
Simon 1980; 1984; Eriksen 1960; Reingold & Merikle
1988). It is simply that tests of unconscious learning must
achieve an adequate level of sensitivity:
Sensitivity Criterion: To show that two dependent
variables (in this case, tests of conscious knowledge and
task performance) relate to dissociable underlying sys-
tems, we must be able to show that our test of aware-
ness is sensitive to all of the relevant conscious knowl-
edge.
Unless this criterion is met, the fact that subjects are able
to transmit more information in their task performance
than in a test of awareness may simply be due to the
greater sensitivity of the performance test to whatever
conscious information the subject has encoded. Let us
take as our null hypothesis the claim that there is a single
source of conscious knowledge that can manifest itself on
both the performance and the awareness test. If perfor-
mance is above chance, but there is no detectable aware-
ness, an immediate inference is that our test of awareness
is simply less sensitive than the performance test to the
available resource of conscious information. Or, to put it
another way, there is conscious knowledge that is not
being detected by the supposed test of awareness but is
contributing to task performance.
To rule out this possibility, we must have either (1) some
independent reason to believe that the test of awareness is
sensitive to all of the potentially relevant conscious infor-
mation, or (2) some reason to believe that the awareness
test is at least as sensitive as the performance test in terms
of its ability to detect relevant conscious information. The
first of these requires demonstrating that the awareness
test is exhaustive, something that Reingold and Merikle
(1988) have noted is likely to be very difficult to do. In
contrast, the second requirement can be met if we try to
make the performance and awareness tests as similar as
possible in terms of retrieval context, differing only in
terms of task instructions. If the instructions in the aware-
ness test encourage the subject to retrieve as much
conscious information as possible, and if the retrieval
contexts in the two tests are approximately matched, then
the Sensitivity Criterion may be met, because it is un-
likely that the performance test would elicit the retrieval
of more conscious information than the awareness test
when the latter has provided subjects with a stronger
motivation to do so. If we still obtain a dissociation
between performance and awareness under such circum-
stances, we will have good evidence of unconscious
learning.x
As an illustration of the application of these criteria,
consider a widely cited implicit learning study by Lewicki
et al. (1987). In the first phase, each trial consisted of the
presentation of a target item in one of the four quadrants
of a computer screen (which, for purposes of discussion,
we can designate as A, B, C, and D); the subjects' task was
simply to press a button corresponding to that quadrant as
quickly as possible. The basic idea of these experiments
can be simply stated: the choice of target location on each
trial was nonrandom, and the question was whether the
subjects would be able to detect this nonrandom ness.
Subjects were presented with sequences of seven tri-
als, with rules constructed so that target locations on the
seventh trial could be predicted from its locations on trials
1, 3, 4, and 6. On each of the first six trials, the digit 6
appeared on its own in one of the quadrants of the screen,
but on trial 7 (the "complex" trial), it was embedded in a
display containing 36 digits. Reaction time on the seventh
trial was the measure of interest. Again, the rules specify-
ing target location were deterministic: thus, if the target
appeared in locations C, A, D, and B on trials 1,3, 4, and 6
respectively, then on trial 7 the target would be in loca-
tion A.
In common with many other such results (which will be
reviewed in sect. 2.7 below), Lewicki etal. (1987, Experi-
ment 1) found that reaction times (RTs) on the target trials
decreased significantly across 4,608 complex trials. In
addition, RTs increased significantly when, toward the
end of the experiment, the rules were changed so that on
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the complex trials the target now appeared in the quad-
rant diagonally opposite where it had appeared previ-
ously. This latter finding rules out nonspecific factors as
the locus of the speedup effect. In a second experiment,
Lewicki et al. applied deterministic rules only on two out
of three sets of seven trials: on the remaining sets, target
location on trial 7 was random. Here, a change in the rules
only affected RTs in the sets that were rule determined
and not in those that were not.
Lewicki et al. found that none of their subjects came
even close to being able to report any of the rules. In fact
"none of the subjects were even able to correctly specify
which four out of six simple trials were the crucial ones"
(1987, p. 529). Thus we appear to have good evidence of a
dissociation between performance and reports. It is
highly doubtful, however, whether these results meet
either the Information or the Sensitivity Criterion. With
regard to the former, Lewicki et al. required subjects to
try to report "at least one pair of co-occurring elements
(i.e., a sequence of four target locations in simple trials
and the corresponding location of the target in the subse-
quent matrix-scanning [complex] trial)" (p. 528). Thus
subjects were classified as able to report something about
the sequence, and hence as aware, only if they were able
to specify a complete sequence of four simple trials and
one complex trial. The problem with this classification,
however, is that to show a speedup in RT, complete
knowledge of the sequences was not necessary.
Analysis of the sequences, for example, shows that even
the last simple trial on its own was informative about
target location on the seventh trial: if the target was in
quadrant A on trial 6, it was twice as likely to be in
quadrants A and D on trial 7 as in quadrants B or C. Trial 6
provided a great deal of information on its own about
target location on trial 7. Knowledge about trials 4 and 6
provided still more information about target location on
trial 7, but if the subjects could report this sort of regu-
larity, it would still not have counted as correct according
to Lewicki et al.'s criterion. It is true that knowledge of
the sequence across the four relevant simple trials pro-
vided absolute certainty about the seventh trial, but our
point is that considerable amounts of speedup in RT could
be attributable to fragmentary knowledge of "microrules"
that Lewicki et al. would not have counted as evidence of
awareness, even if the subjects could articulate them.
Turning to the Sensitivity Criterion, we may ask
whether the verbal report test is an adequate measure of
the subject's awareness in this procedure. We suggest that
it is not. First, we cannot be sure that the performance
and awareness tests are matched in terms of the conscious
information they pick up, because quite different re-
trieval contexts are provided for the two tests. In the case
of RTs, performance is elicited in a context where (1)
stimuli are presented on the computer screen, (2) re-
sponses are made on the keyboard, (3) a horizontal and a
vertical line appear on the screen dividing it into quad-
rants, (4) a response is made very soon after the preceding
response, and so on. All these cues are pertinent, in that
they were present during the learning phase (which is just
the RT task). In the case of verbal report, none of these
cues is present. Instead, the subject is required to re-
trieve the sequence rules from memory, without the aid of
any of the aforementioned cues.
Second, we have little reason to believe that the verbal
report test provides an exhaustive index of conscious
information, since there are other tests such as recogni-
tion that manifestly detect information left undetected by
verbal report tests. For example, Nelson (1978) compared
the sensitivity of recognition and verbal recall in the
following way. Suppose we have two memory tests, A and
B. Subjects learn a list of items and are then given test A.
Then, test B is applied only to those study items that test
A failed to detect. If test B detects any of these items, it is
said to be more sensitive than test A. It is important also to
apply the tests in the reverse order - test B, then test A -
and to fail to observe an increase in sensitivity. Using such
a procedure, Nelson showed that recognition tests can
detect items not detected by free recall tests, but the
converse was not true. Hence, recognition is a more
sensitive test than free recall, and the latter is therefore
not exhaustive.
Moreover, note that it is possible that subjects misin-
terpret free report questions to mean they should only
report rules. They might believe that fragmentary infor-
mation is not supposed to be reported. Many researchers
have attempted to avoid this problem by asking more and
more specific questions about what stimuli may begin or
end a sequence, and so on. Such questions are somewhat
better from a sensitivity standpoint because they are
more specific (and provide more cues), and may be better
from an informational standpoint if they ask about the
information that subjects actually learn.
In sum, we suggest that the Information and Sensitivity
Criteria are not met in Lewicki et al.'s (1987) experiment.
The default hypothesis - that there is only a single
resource of conscious information - may be correct, with
less of that knowledge being detected by the verbal report
test than by the RT task. There is no evidence that the
knowledge used to perform the RT task is any different or
is in any way acquired independently of the knowledge
that the subject's reports are based on. Verbal reports are
impoverished compared to task performance simply be-
cause less of the available information is retrieved in the
test of reportable knowledge. If the subject were given
enough retrieval cues, there is every reason to believe
that this knowledge could be brought to consciousness
and reported; it is simply that a normal test of verbal
report does not do this. Last, if sufficient cues could make
the information conscious, there is every reason to be-
lieve that it was conscious at the time of encoding.
It is important to note that we are not denying the
empirical fact that performance and verbal reports can be
dissociated. On the contrary, we acknowledge that there
have been numerous satisfactory demonstrations of this
(for example, in Lewicki et al.'s [1987] experiment), and
that this has interesting implications for applied psychol-
ogy. Subjects' performance indicates that they have
learned something, yet they are poor at articulating ver-
bally what they have learned. Instead, we are suggesting
that this dissociation is only very weak evidence for the
claim that the original learning was unconscious, and that
it provides no evidence at all for the functional dissocia-
tion of conscious and unconscious learning. Its status is
exactly the same as the difference that commonly
emerges between tests of recall and recognition. For the
same reason, amnesic patients' inability to recall informa-
tion that an earlier test shows they had learned (e.g.,
Nissen & Bullemer 1987) is not in its own right evidence
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of unconscious learning. Since we are claiming that a
dissociation between performance and verbal report is
not compelling evidence for unconscious learning, we
place special weight (below) on studies that have tried to
use more sensitive tests of awareness.
It is also important to recognize that our criteria do not
make unconscious learning undemonstrable. As Bowers
(1984) has noted, it is pointless to argue about a possible
unconscious process if one's criteria for its existence make
it a logical impossibility. But the Information Criterion
can readily be met in any study that establishes unequivo-
cally what it is that the subject is learning, and the
Sensitivity Criterion can be met by tests that adequately
reinstate the learning context or that attempt to be ex-
haustive with respect to conscious information. Indeed,
we will see in section 2.7 below that a replication of
Lewicki et al.'s experiment by Stadler (1989) met both of
these criteria by using an alternative test of awareness.
Furthermore, successful demonstrations of unconscious
perception have been possible in experiments that use
tests of awareness that meet these criteria (e.g., Merikle
& Reingold 1990). In sum, Lewicki et al.'s (1987) experi-
ments demonstrate the dangers of asking the wrong
questions and of ignoring substantial differences between
different types of test.
With these considerations in mind, we now turn to
other evidence for learning without awareness. In the
following sections, we focus on four areas of experimental
evidence: conditioning, artificial grammar learning, in-
strumental learning, and sequential pattern acquisition.
2.4. Awareness and conditioning
2.4.1. Pavlovian conditioning. We begin with a consider-
ation of whether classical or Pavlovian conditioned re-
sponses can be acquired in the absence of awareness of the
scheduled contingency of reinforcement. Since many
researchers regard conditioning as representing a rela-
tively primitive learning system (see Boakes 1989), it is
plausible to imagine that learning without awareness can
occur in this context. The conclusion from a huge number
of studies, however, is quite the opposite: there is no
compelling evidence for conditioning in human subjects
without awareness of the reinforcement contingency. This
conclusion was first reached in a classic review by Brewer
(1974), and more recent studies have not changed the
situation (see Boakes 1989; Dawson & Schell 1985, for
reviews). Such conclusions have not always been heeded,
however, because there are still claims in the literature to
the effect that conditioning can occur without awareness
(e.g., Musen et al. 1990, p. 1074) and is hence an instance
of implicit, unconscious learning.
There have been two general approaches to examining
the relationship between conditioning and awareness.
First, some studies have sought to ascertain whether
instructions to the subject concerning the nature of the
relationship between a cue and a reinforcer affect condi-
tioning as measured, for instance, by GSRs. The rationale
is that if conditioning is a relatively automatic form of
learning that can proceed independently of awareness,
then changes in the subjects' conscious beliefs ought to
have little effect on their behavior. Using this logic,
Grings et al. (1973), for example, presented subjects with
two conditioned stimuli (CSs), one of which (CS + ) was
followed by a shock unconditioned stimulus (US), and one
of which (CS—) was not. At the end of the training
stage, CS+ elicited a larger conditioned GSR than did
CS —. Prior to the second stage, subjects were correctly
told that the relationship between stimuli and shocks
would now be reversed, with shocks following CS— but
not CS + .
As has been observed in many other studies, these
instructions had a powerful effect on conditioned re-
sponding. Grings et al. found that their subjects re-
sponded on the first trial of the second stage to CS— but
not to CS + , indicating that their knowledge at least
partially controlled their responding. Significantly, the
response to CS + , a stimulus that had been paired several
times with shock, was no greater than the response to a
control stimulus that in the first stage had been presented
with uncorrelated USs. Similar results of verbal instruc-
tion have been obtained in experiments using phobic
stimuli such as pictures of snakes (Davey 1992), where it
was once thought that conditioned responding could
proceed independently of instructions (e.g., Hugdahl &
Ohman 1977).
Although such results are unsupportive of the notion
that conditioning can proceed without awareness, they do
not address the issue directly because awareness itself is
not examined. A recent experiment by Lovibond (1992)
exemplifies the approach of eliciting measures of aware-
ness concurrently with conditioned responses. Lovibond
presented subjects with two stimuli (slides depicting
flowers or mushrooms), one of which (the CS+) was
paired with shock while the other (CS-) was nonrein-
forced. Awareness of the relationship between the stimuli
and shock was measured in two ways. First, during the
learning phase subjects continually adjusted a pointer to
indicate their moment-by-moment expectation of shock
(note that asking for a rating of shock expectancy does not
specifically direct attention to the A-B relationship); and
second, at the end of the experiment they were given a
structured interview designed to assess their awareness.
It should be apparent how the design conforms to the
basic procedure depicted in Figure 1, except that there
are four learning trials. In Lovibond's experiments, each
of trials 2-4 in fact represents a new learning trial, an
assessment of whether learning occurred on the preced-
ing trial(s), and an assessment of the subject's awareness
on the preceding trial(s). The Information Criterion
should not raise particular problems here, because there
is little doubt that the information the subjects learn (the
contingency between the CS and US) corresponds with
what the awareness test asks them to report.
In each of the experiments, some subjects gave no
indication, on either of the tests of awareness, that they
associated A with shock to a greater extent than B.
Critically, these subjects also gave no hint of stronger
conditioned responding to A than to B. For subjects who
were aware of the conditioning contingencies, GSRs were
stronger to A than to B. Thus, on the basis of these results
we would have to conclude that learning about a CS-shock
relationship does not occur in the absence of awareness of
that relationship. It is also worth noting that Lovibond's
experimental design is well suited to demonstrating that
our criteria for implicit learning do not make it a logical
impossibility. If his results had been different - . some-
thing which is simply an empirical matter - the criteria
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would have been met and implicit learning could have
been firmly established.
Other studies have tried to mask the CS-US relation-
ship and again compare awareness and conditioning. The
results have been clear: so long as awareness is measured
by an immediate test, usually a recognition test, signifi-
cant conditioning only occurs in situations where the
subject is aware of the contingency (see Boakes 1989;
Dawson & Schell 1985). One recent experiment serves to
illustrate the typical result. Marinkovic et al. (1989) pre-
sented their subjects with a recognition memory task for
odors. On each trial, one odor was presented for 8 sec as a
"target," followed in succession by three further odors.
Subjects' primary task was to say which of the three was
the same as the target. One of the three recognition odors
was in fact either the CS+ or the CS- . If it was CS+, a
shock was presented at its offset; skin conductance was
measured as the conditioned response. The question of
interest was whether acquisition of GSRs could occur
without concurrent awareness of the contingency be-
tween the CS+ and the shock. Marinkovic et al. mea-
sured awareness with a test in which subjects were re-
quired to indicate their expectancy of the shock during
each odor on a 7-point scale. Because awareness was
measured during the CSs, this again represents a concur-
rent assessment of awareness, rather than a post hoc one.
The outcome was that differential conditioning to CS +
was only observed in subjects classified as aware, indicat-
ing that awareness is necessary for conditioning. In addi-
tion, Marinkovic et al. obtained some evidence that when
conditioned responding did occur, it only started after the
onset of awareness. In sum, results from conditioning
experiments appear to contradict the notion that this type
of learning can proceed without concurrent awareness.
For a variety of reasons, some researchers have ques-
tioned whether GSRs condition in the same way other
responses, such as the eyeblink or salivary reflexes, do.
Thus it is worth noting that correspondences between
awareness and conditioning seem to occur with other
response systems as well (e.g., for eyelid conditioning,
Baer & Fuhrer 1982).
The conclusion from these studies is clear, and con-
firms Brewer's (1974) earlier analysis: Pavlovian condi-
tioning, which is often cited as a fundamental form of
learning, does not seem to occur in the absence of aware-
ness of the reinforcement contingency.
2.4.2. Evaluative conditioning. Evaluative conditioning
refers to a form of learning that manifests itself in changes
in affective response to a stimulus (Martin & Levey 1978).
Specifically, it refers to the transfer of affect from a US to a
CS. Some authors (e.g., Baeyens et al. 1990a; Martin &
Levey 1987) have suggested that - unlike standard Pavlo-
vian conditioning - this form of learning can proceed in
the absence of awareness of the CS-US relationship. We
briefly review some of the relevant evidence.
Baeyens et al. (1990a) presented subjects with 10 repe-
titions of a CS-US pair of slides, in which the CS slide had
been previously evaluated by the subject as affectively
neutral and the US slide as either liked, neutral, or
disliked. Evaluative conditioning was observed in that on
a postconditioning test of affect, the CS slides became
affectively positive (liked) if they had been paired with a
liked US, negative (disliked) if they had been paired with
a disliked US, and they remained neutral if they had been
paired with another neutral stimulus.
As a test of awareness, at the end of the learning phase
Baeyens et al. showed the subjects each of the CS pictures
and asked them to identify which had been the relevant
US. If subjects failed to respond correctly they were then
asked whether the US had been liked, neutral, or dis-
liked. They were classified as "unaware" of the CS-US
relationship if they failed on both of these questions.
Evidence that evaluative conditioning occurred without
awareness emerged in the observation that conditioning
was the same for CS-US pairs, regardless of whether or
not the subject was aware of the relationship.
Of course, the test of awareness may have been an
insensitive one. Baeyens et al. accordingly tried to use a
more sensitive concurrent measure of awareness. One
group of subjects was required to indicate during the
4-sec interval between the onset of the CS and US slides
whether they expected a liked, neutral, or disliked US
stimulus on that trial. Subjects were classified as "un-
aware" if they failed to respond correctly on the final three
pairings of each stimulus combination. Unfortunately,
results from this group undermine the notion of uncon-
scious learning. As discussed in section 2.3, subjects
could accurately report most of the pairings, and for those
few they could not report, there was no significant evalua-
tive conditioning. Further, in another study, Baeyens et
al. (1992) found that groups of subjects given increasing
numbers of CS-US pairings showed an increase in both
the magnitude of evaluative conditioning and the level of
awareness as measured by a postconditioning test. In
sum, these studies of evaluative conditioning have failed
to show that it can occur unconsciously. (See Shanks &
Dickinson 1990, for further criticisms of this research.)
Although they are not usually classified as studies of
evaluative conditioning, Lewicki's (1986; Lewicki et al.,
1989) experiments on the learning of nonsalient contin-
gencies can be readily conceived as such. Lewicki pre-
sented subjects with photographs of people accompanied
by personality descriptions such as "kind" or "capable."
For some subjects all "kind" people had long hair and all
"capable' people had short hair, while for other subjects
the opposite was the case. Lewicki reported that on test
trials in which subjects had to affirm or disconfirm state-
ments classifying new people as either "kind" or "capa-
ble, " they responded "yes" more often when the descrip-
tion preserved the study-phase correlation than when it
broke the correlation. (They also consistently took longer
to answer "yes" when the correlation was preserved.)
Lewicki's (1986) subjects were apparently unaware of
the relationship between hair length and personality
description, because "not one subject mentioned haircut
or anything connected with hair" (p. 138) in a test of
verbally reportable knowledge. If we take the personality
description as being an evaluative response conditioned
to the cue of hair length, the results would again appear to
suggest unconscious evaluative learning. However, that
conclusion requires us to assume, without any supportive
evidence, that the Sensitivity Criterion has been met in
these studies. In addition, some of Lewicki's results have
proven hard to replicate (see de Houwer et al., in press;
Dulany & Poldrack 1991); so we must at this stage reserve
judgment on whether this form of learning indeed can
occur unconsciously.
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2.4.3. Conclusions. In experiments examining the rela-
tionship between learning and awareness in Pavlovian
conditioning, researchers have striven to meet the Sensi-
tivity Criterion by using multiple tests of awareness. The
Information Criterion does not raise particular problems,
because there is little doubt that the information the
subjects learn (the contingency between CS and US)
corresponds to what the awareness test asks them to
report. Thus these studies provide a reasonably good test
of the role of awareness in learning. The results we have
surveyed give little reason to believe that unconscious
learning can occur in these situations. For evaluative
conditioning the evidence is less clear-cut, but we have
few reservations in suggesting that unconscious evalua-
tive learning has not yet been adequately established.
2.5. Awareness In artificial grammar learning tasks
Studies of subjects learning artificial grammars present
the classic pattern of unconscious learning: subjects
clearly learn something about the input domain, but they
appear unable either to report the rules of the grammar or
to explain their performance. Such studies provide evi-
dence of unconscious learning if learning involves rule
induction. In this section we examine the evidence for
unconscious learning of artificial grammars and conclude
that memorization rather than rule induction is the prin-
cipal process involved; we conclude that evidence for
unconscious learning is weak. Later, in section 3.5, we
review several further studies that have examined con-
scious hypothesis testing in artificial grammar tasks.
In a prototypical experiment, Reber (1967) required
subjects to memorize either a series of letter strings
generated from a small finite-state grammar or a series of
strings generated at random (see Fig. 2). Subjects who
learned the rule-governed strings then performed a gram-
maticality test in which they were asked to accept novel
strings that fit the rules and reject novel strings that did
not. They categorized 79% of the 44 test strings correctly,
which is significantly above chance. Yet these subjects
were unable to report the rules they had apparently
learned and then used in the grammaticality task.
Reber's (e.g., 1967; 1989a) account of such grammar-
learning results, endorsed by many other investigators
since then, proposed that subjects use an unconscious, or
implicit, rule-induction mechanism. This mechanism
creates a knowledge-base of rules that may be used in a
grammaticality task but that is inaccessible to conscious
report. As with the other unconscious learning para-
digms, we believe that there is another way to interpret
the data. We can raise two questions. The first (the
Sensitivity Criterion) is whether retrospective verbal re-
port is sufficiently sensitive to test for conscious knowl-
edge of the rules. More sensitive measures of subjects'
knowledge, such as concurrent thinking-aloud protocols
and recognition tests might reveal marginal or uncertain
knowledge. The second question (the Information Crite-
rion) concerns what the subjects are learning from the
training strings. If subjects have learned something other
than rules, then asking them about rules may lead to
erroneous conclusions. On the other hand, if we ask the
subjects questions about what they did in fact learn, we
may get reasonable answers. It may be that usable knowl-
edge is always both consciously learned and consciously
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Figure 2. String generator and example strings, (a) Diagram
of a finite-state grammar. Strings are generated by selecting one
of the possible routes through the network, commencing at
"start" and continuing until one of the "end" symbols is reached.
(b) Several example strings generated by the grammar.
applied. The experimenter's job is to discern what informa-
tion subjects are aware of during training and whether that
information is used to perform the grammaticality task.
2.5.1. Types Of knowledge. The literature has identified
three types of knowledge that might be acquired by
subjects: rules, memory for whole strings, and knowledge
of the frequency and position of substrings, such as pairs
of letters. There are several problems with rules. First, it
is not really clear what a "rule" would be like: Is it a
rewrite rule or a transition graph? How complex can it be,
and how many are there? Second, such rules would be
very difficult for any but very sophisticated subjects to
articulate even if they did explicitly acquire them. Third,
it is not clear what sort of mechanism is capable of
acquiring such rules, particularly since it must ex hypoth-
esi operate outside consciousness. In the face of these
questions, it seems sensible to consider other types of
knowledge first, and to determine the extent to which
they can account for subjects' performance. We return to
the evidence for knowledge of rules in artificial grammar
learning tasks in section 2.5.3.
The picture with regard to memory for whole strings
and knowledge of substrings seems reasonably clear.
Such knowledge is easy to articulate and there is ample
evidence that subjects do acquire this information, be-
cause they do articulate it. These types of knowledge are
also consistent with a variety of contemporary memory
models, such as chunking (Servan-Schreiber & Anderson
1990), distributed memory (Cleeremans & McClelland
1991), and memory-array models (e.g., Estes 1986; Hintz-
man 1986; Nosofsky 1986). In addition, these models have
been shown to approximate subjects' grammaticality test
performance. For example, Dienes (1992) compared a
number of these memory models on a set of gram-
maticality judgment data and was able to achieve good
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fits, particularly with distributed memory models. We
return to this topic in section 3.3.
With these different knowledge types in mind, we can
now ask what sort of information subjects in artificial
grammar learning tasks actually acquire, and whether
they are conscious of it. A number of studies have asked
these questions using several methods and have asked
them at various points during training and testing.
Mathews et al. (1989) interrupted subjects periodically
during training and asked them to instruct an imaginary
confederate how to distinguish the grammatical strings.
The trained subjects performed better on the gram-
maticality test than did the yoked subjects, suggesting
that not all of the trained subjects' knowledge was explicit
and reportable. This verbal report procedure, however, is
essentially uncued recall, and so is unlikely to evoke all of
the subjects' knowledge of the grammar. More interest-
ing, though, is that the verbal instructions that subjects
did report consisted mainly of legal bigrams and other
short sequences, sometimes coded by their positions in
legal strings.
In a study by Servan-Schreiber and Anderson (1990),
subjects were trained on grammatical strings using a
recall task. For training, the strings were divided into
substrings using gaps (T PPP TX VS). Servan-Schreiber
and Anderson hypothesized that subjects in all grammar-
learning tasks encoded the strings into substring chunks,
and the gaps were used to ensure consistent chunkings
across subjects. Subjects' written recall preserved these
gaps. Servan-Schreiber and Anderson suggested that this
phenomenon demonstrates that subjects were in fact
encoding the strings as sequences of short strings in
accord with the gaps. The subjects' later grammaticality
judgments supported this contention as follows. Servan-
Schreiber and Anderson constructed ungrammatical
strings that consisted of illegal sequences of legal sub-
strings (e.g., PPPTXTVS). If subjects were learning just
the substrings then these strings would be falsely ac-
cepted as legal strings. Indeed, 50% of these strings were
mistakenly accepted. On the other hand, test strings that
violated specific substrings were correctly rejected; only
26% of these strings were mistakenly accepted. Both
subjects' written protocols during training and their test
performance, then, support the hypothesis that subjects
learn simple substring information in grammar-learning
tasks. That only 50% rather than 100% of the strings
containing illegal sequences of legal substrings were ac-
cepted does not imply that knowledge of substrings is
insufficient to account for performance completely. Com-
pared to grammatical strings, these nongrammatical
strings (by definition) still contain illegal bigrams (e.g.,
XT in the example above). In addition, subjects' knowl-
edge at test time is clearly incomplete: previously seen
grammatical strings were only accepted 70% of the time.
Moreover, Servan-Schreiber and Anderson (1990)
went on to build a model that acquired chunks and then
used them to evaluate the grammaticality of test strings.
The model performed at the level of trained subjects (r =
0.935). This result supports their claim that subjects are
learning and using chunks by demonstrating that chunks
are learnable and sufficient to account for the level of
performance of subjects on the grammaticality task.
It is possible that Servan-Schreiber and Anderson's
presentation technique, placing gaps in the training
strings, biased subjects' learning procedure. A similar
experiment by Perruchet and Pacteau (1990), however,
used the standard (no gap) format during training and
found similar results. Subjects were trained on strings
generated from the same grammar that Reber and Allen
(1978) used. To test for awareness of simple substrings,
trained subjects performed a recognition test on letter
pairs present in the training strings. Subjects performed
quite well: only 3 out of 25 old pairs were judged less
familiar than any new pair. The correlation between
recognition scores and the frequency of occurrence of
pairs in the training strings was 0.61. According to the
results of the recognition test, then, subjects were aware
of the relative frequencies of letter pairs. Similarly, Du-
lany et al. (1984) concluded that a recognition test of
awareness could elicit as much knowledge as was pro-
jected in the grammaticality test.
Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) also constructed test
strings that contained either (1) illegal orders of legal
pairs, or (2) illegal pairs. If subjects only had information
about legal pairs on which to judge the grammaticality of
test strings, then the illegal pairs should have been
rejected, but the illegal orders of legal pairs should have
been mistakenly accepted as grammatical. This is the
pattern of results Perruchet and Pacteau obtained. Dis-
criminability, measured in D scores (zero indicates ran-
dom responding), was 22 for illegal pairs but only 7 for
illegal orders. These results therefore further support the
hypothesis that subjects are aware of and make use of only
simple substring information.
Perruchet and Pacteau then considered a model that
used pair frequency information to make grammaticality
judgments. The model produced the same level of perfor-
mance as subjects, except in one instance. Subjects were
sensitive to the beginnings and endings of strings, but the
model was not. Perruchet and Pacteau concluded that
subjects primarily knew letter pairs, but also which pairs
could legally start and end strings. Together with the
behavior of Servan-Schreiber and Anderson's (1990)
chunking model, these results show that simple
fragment-memorization systems can be sufficient to ac-
count for subjects' imperfect performance on gram-
maticality tests.
Dienes et al. (1991) also found evidence that subjects
were sensitive to more than just pairs. Following training
and a grammaticality task, subjects were given incom-
plete letter sequences varying in length from zero letters
upwards (e.g., VXT. . .) and asked to judge which single-
letter continuations (M? V? X? R? T?) were acceptable at
the next location in the string. In this sequential letter
dependencies (SLD) task, which was hypothesized to be
sensitive to conscious knowledge of the grammar, sub-
jects were sensitive to illegal orders of legal pairs even in
the middle of strings. Dienes et al. showed that the
knowledge that subjects demonstrated in the completion
task correlated with their grammaticality judgments and
could be used to model the grammaticality judgment
data. They found in addition that knowledge gleaned from
subjects' free reports also correlated with their gram-
maticality judgments, but that less knowledge was re-
ported in the free report task than in the continuation
task. These correlations suggest that a single knowledge
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source is tapped by both tasks, but that the free report
task, uncued recall, is less sensitive.
Reber and Allen (1978) asked subjects to describe
retrospectively their learning experience and, concur-
rently, to justify their grammaticality judgments. Overall,
subjects justified their classifications on 821 out of 2,000
test strings. Subjects reported using a variety of informa-
tion in making their grammaticality judgments. The viola-
tion or nonviolation of bigrams was the most common
justification, especially concerning the first bigram of a
string. String-initial bigrams accounted for fully 30% of
the justifications. Violations of single letters, particularly
the first or last letter of a string, and violations of trigram
or longer sequences were also reported, as well as recog-
nition of and similarity to whole training strings. The
grammaticality responses to the remaining unjustified
cases presumably consisted of guessing or of knowledge
that could not be elicited by verbal report.
So much for substring knowledge. Vokey and Brooks
(1992; Brooks & Vokey 1991) have argued that subjects
can encode whole-item information in addition to sub-
string information. They found that the similarity of test
strings to specific whole-study strings is an important
factor in subjects' grammaticality judgments. When the
grammaticality and the similarity of the test strings were
varied independently, they were shown to be additive
factors on grammaticality judgments. Vokey and Brooks
argued that such a result indicates that subjects have
encoded the whole strings and can determine similarity
relationships between strings.
Brooks and Vokey's evidence for whole-string informa-
tion raises no particular problems for our interpretation of
the artificial grammar learning data, since subjects are
clearly aware of their whole-string knowledge just as they
are aware of the substring knowledge; the study task, after
all, requires the subjects specifically to memorize whole
strings. However, as Brooks and Vokey (1991, p. 321)
themselves concede, their results can at least in principle
be explained without reference to whole-item knowl-
edge. Just as grammatical test strings tend to contain
more studied bigrams than nongrammatical strings (Per-
ruchet & Pacteau 1990), so also a test string that is highly
similar to a study string will contain more studied bigrams
than one that is less similar. In fact, Vokey and Brooks'
results have been challenged by Perruchet (1994), who
has shown that both the effect of similarity and the
apparently independent effect of grammaticality that
Vokey and Brooks obtained can in turn be reduced to
substring knowledge. Grammatical test strings tend to
contain more substring components that were part of the
training strings than do nongrammatical items. The same
is true for similar and dissimilar test items, with similar
items tending to contain more substring components
from the study strings.
A final piece of evidence supports the view that gram-
maticality judgments are controlled by comparison to
memorized substring or whole-item information. On
such a view, but not on an abstraction account, it is likely
that judgments would be relatively susceptible to changes
in the superficial characteristics of the studied strings. To
test this, Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) required subjects
to pronounce the training strings from one grammar and
to spell the training strings from another grammar. At
test, subjects were asked either to pronounce or to spell
test strings and to judge their grammatical status. Sub-
jects were more likely to assign test strings to grammars
when the encoding task matched the task for the test
string than when they differed. Test strings that were
equally similar to strings in both grammars were assigned
to the grammar where the encoding and test tasks
matched. Such results, although consistent with the idea
that judgments are based on a comparison with a set of
items in memory that represent the study items in a
relatively unanalyzed form, would clearly not be antici-
pated if what was encoded were the underlying abstract
rules of the grammar.
Our conclusion from this section, then, is that subjects
use their memory system to acquire knowledge of (possi-
bly) whole strings and (certainly) their parts, and that this
simple information is conscious both during acquisition
and testing. The results reported by Dulany et al. (1984),
Perruchet and Pacteau (1990), and Dienes et al. (1991)
show that the knowledge that subjects can consciously
retrieve in a recognition test is sufficient to explain their
grammaticality judgments. From the evidence we have
considered, we do not need to assume the existence of an
additional implicit knowledge base, and conclusions to
the contrary have arisen because of failures to meet the
Information Criterion.
Our interpretation rests on the results of a variety of
tests of conscious knowledge that have attempted to
address the Sensitivity Criterion. Dienes et al.'s (1991)
SLD test, for instance, which required subjects to judge
which continuations of a sequence of letters were legal,
was actually found in a signal detection analysis to be more
sensitive than the implicit grammaticality test itself.
Thus, if such a test is accepted as a measure of explicit
knowledge, no evidence of a dissociation between learn-
ing and awareness emerges. Of course, an alternative (see
Reber et al. 1985; and the reply, Dulany et al. 1985) is to
argue that performance on these explicit tests is contami-
nated by unconscious influences; subjects may choose a
correct continuation on the SLD test as a result of some
implicit knowledge to which they do not have conscious
access.2 The problem with this interpretation, however,
is that it means we would have to abandon the test as an
index of conscious learning and rely instead on verbal
reports, in which case it is hard to see how the Sensitivity
Criterion can ever be met. And if that criterion cannot be
met, then how are defenders of unconscious learning ever
going to unconfound test type from sensitivity, and hence
establish the existence of unconscious learning?
We believe it is rather unlikely that unconscious influ-
ences play a significant role in the SLD test. Presenting
subjects with a letter sequence (e.g., VXT. . .)andasking
them to judge, under no time pressure, whether a given
letter (e.g., M) could continue the sequence would seem
to be a prototypical example of a task requiring conscious
reflection, even if it involves mere conscious recollection
of studied strings. Nevertheless, to claim that the SLD
test is only sensitive to conscious information does re-
quire adopting what Reingold and Merikle (1988) call the
"exclusiveness" assumption: the assumption that perfor-
mance on a test of awareness is only affected by conscious
influences. This, of course, is a very strong assumption
and one that may well be incorrect.
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2.5.2. Learning systems. In addition to the question of
awareness, a second issue concerns whether whole item,
bigram, and possibly rule information are acquired by a
single learning system or by separate systems. If they are
acquired by separate systems, perhaps those systems
interfere with each other's operation? To examine this
possibility, Reber and Allen (1978) manipulated the train-
ing task. Subjects either observed the strings without any
explicit task (observation training), or they performed a
paired-associate task, where each string was paired with a
different city name. The idea was that the paired-
associate task would require better item encoding,
thereby facilitating item knowledge but potentially inhi-
biting other learning processes.
The paired-associate task produced several significant
differences from the observation task. Overall, paired-
associate subjects were less accurate on their gram-
maticality judgments: 72.4% versus 81.2% accurate for
observation subjects. Paired-associate subjects produced
twice as many recognition justifications as did observation
subjects (77 vs. 40), and paired-associate subjects' proba-
bility of making consistent errors suggested they were
more likely to develop unrepresentative knowledge than
were observation subjects.
Clearly, the two training tasks affected the quantity of
whole-item and substring knowledge that was acquired,
but the underlying learning processes do not appear to be
in opposition. The verbal reports show that both groups
justified their responses with the same knowledge
sources, but to differing degrees. It appears, then, that
whole-item learning is compatible with substring learn-
ing. Vokey and Brooks (1992) examined a range of encod-
ing tasks that produce differences in the extent of item
knowledge, but they also found no reliable interference
between item knowledge and substring knowledge.
Finally, Dienes et al. (1991) required subjects to gener-
ate random digits during training. Their goal was to test
whether this task would interfere selectively with sub-
jects given explicit instructions to search for rules that
describe the study strings, but not with subjects given
implicit instructions simply to observe the study strings.
Instead, Dienes et al. found equivalent reductions in
learning for both implicitly and explicitly instructed
subjects.
2.5.3. Implicit rule induction. Although the considerable
evidence presented above supports the conclusion that
subjects' knowledge consists of simple substrings (or whole
strings), there are two further pieces of evidence that
support the conclusion that subjects learn rules. The first
piece of evidence supporting rule learning was reported
by Reber and Lewis (1977). Subjects were trained on a
subset of strings and then solved "anagrams" based on the
remaining strings generated from the grammar - that is to
say, they took strings of letters and rearranged them to
make grammatical strings. The frequencies of bigrams
produced by subjects in the anagram task were tabulated
and compared with the frequencies of the bigrams in the
training set and in the full set of grammatical strings. If
subjects were learning bigram frequencies from the train-
ing strings, the correlation between the frequencies of
bigrams in the training strings and in the solved anagram
strings should be high. While this was the case, Reber and
Lewis found that the correlation between the frequencies
of bigrams in the solved anagrams and in the whole
grammar was actually higher. This result suggests that the
subjects went beyond the training set to learn the rules of
the grammar.
Perruchet et al. (1992), however, argued that Reber and
Lewis's (1977) result must hold on statistical grounds
alone. The anagrams demand the production of certain
bigrams and not others, in fact, exactly those bigrams that
are underrepresented in the training set. Suppose, for
example, that VT is a bigram in the grammar that is
underrepresented among the training strings. VT must
then be overrepresented among the solved anagram
strings since the training and correctly solved anagram
strings together constitute the complete set of grammati-
cal strings. It is no wonder, then, that the correlation
between the frequencies of anagram bigrams and training
bigrams is low and that the correlation between anagram
bigrams and the full grammar bigrams is higher. Per-
ruchet et al. went on to demonstrate this fact empirically
by training subjects only on the individual bigrams from
the training strings. Under these circumstances, subjects
could not be learning rules because they only saw bi-
grams, yet as with Reber and Lewis's subjects the fre-
quencies of their anagram bigrams also correlated better
with the full grammar bigrams than with the training
string bigrams. The original conclusion, therefore, that
subjects go beyond the training strings to learn rules
appears to have been an artifact of the experimental
design.
The second and more compelling piece of evidence for
abstraction is the fact that subjects show some degree of
transfer to strings governed by the same underlying
grammar, but formed from a new set of letters or from a
completely new set of stimuli such as tones. Reber (1969)
trained subjects to recall grammatical strings, and when
he switched to a new set of letters, subjects showed no
increase in recall errors. This result suggested that sub-
jects had learned abstract rules that were easily instanti-
ated with different letters. More impressively, Altmann
et al. (in press) required subjects to observe a set of letter
strings, generated from the grammar shown in Figure 2,
prior to making grammaticality judgments concerning
sequences of tones. Some of the tone sequences could be
generated from the grammar by substituting a tone for a
letter (e.g., middle C for the letter M). Altmann et al.
found that exposure to letter sequences allowed gram-
matical and nongrammatical tone sequences to be dis-
criminated at better-than-chance levels. Although the
improvement was generally small (about 5% increase in
correct classifications), this result strongly suggests that at
least some aspects of the abstract structure of the letter
sequences had been isolated and were available to aid
classification of the tone sequences.
It is important to note that the change of stimulus set
did have a detrimental effect on performance, however.
Compared to a situation in which the study and test items
were from the same set (both letters or both tones),
classification performance was significantly impaired
when the study and test sets differed. Thus, abstract
knowledge was plainly not the sole source of information
that subjects were relying on - specific memorized frag-
ments or strings must also have been playing a role. A
study by Mathews et al. (1989) confirms this conclusion.
In Mathews et al.'s study, over a series of training sessions
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subjects were trained either on a single-string set or on
different sets generated from the same underlying gram-
mar. Subjects in the same set condition learned better,
and a final switch to a new set doubled the error rates in
the single-set training condition. Such a result would not
be expected if an abstract set of underlying rules were the
sole factor guiding classification, because the rules would
apply equally to the new and to the original letter set.
What is the significance of these results for unconscious
learning? To the extent that subjects might be poor at
describing what they have abstracted, such results may
imply that unconscious learning is taking place. But given
the rather small improvement in classification perfor-
mance that results from training and testing on different
sets of items, it is quite likely that what is abstracted is
fairly limited (e.g., only two initial symbols are legal, the
first two symbols of a string cannot be the same, etc.), and
it is quite possible that subjects, if asked, would be able to
report such simple regularities. In sum, although the data
from transfer studies do suggest that some aspects of the
underlying structure can be abstracted, from the point of
view of unconscious learning the significance of these
findings has yet to be established.
2.5.4. Conclusions. These studies indicate that relatively
simple information is to a large extent sufficient to account
for subjects' behavior in artificial grammar learning tasks.
In addition, and most important, this knowledge appears
to be reportable by subjects. Appreciable knowledge of
the grammar does not seem to be acquired by explicit
hypothesis testing or other complex analytic processes
(although we return in sect. 3.2 to consider some rather
different cases where grammars appear to be learned
explicitly). Instead, knowledge seems to be mainly accu-
mulated over training by simple memory mechanisms
that collect frequency statistics on bigrams, slightly
longer sequences, and possibly whole items.
2.6. Awareness in instrumental learning tasks
In contrast to the conditioning and artificial grammar
studies described above, which arrange relationships be-
tween external cues, instrumental tasks establish some
contingency between an action the subject performs and
an associated outcome. Learning is measured as a change
across trials in the propensity to perform the action.
Naturally, the question we may again ask is whether such
learning can occur without awareness. As in his review of
Pavlovian learning studies, Brewer (1974) concluded that
the answer to this question is no. There have recently
been some further investigations of the role of awareness
in instrumental learning: we consider results separately
from tasks in which the instrumental contingency is
simple or more complex. By "simple" we mean any task in
which there is ostensibly just one action available to the
subject.
2.6.1. Simple instrumental learning tasks. Svartdal (1989;
1991) has reported a number of studies in which subjects
are led to believe that there is a relationship between a
reinforcer and one aspect of responding, when in fact the
critical variable is some other aspect of responding. For
example, Svartdal (1991) presented subjects with brief
trains of between 4 and 17 auditory "clicks." Subjects
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immediately had to press a response button exactly the
same number of times and were instructed that feedback
would be presented when the number of presses matched
the number of clicks. In reality, however, feedback was
contingent on the rate of responding: for some subjects, it
was given when the interresponse times (IRTs) were
lower than in a baseline phase, while for others it was
given when IRTs were higher.
Svartdal (1991) obtained evidence of learning, in that
IRTs adjusted appropriately to the reinforcement contin-
gencies, but subjects seemed to be unaware that it was the
rate of responding that was important. A structured ques-
tionnaire revealed no evidence of awareness of the contin-
gency between response rate and feedback in subjects
whose response rate had adjusted appropriately.
Such demonstrations appear at first glance to be quite
compelling, especially as the contingency to be learned is
such a simple one. It is unclear, however, that the Infor-
mation Criterion is met in these and similar studies,
because it is very difficult to rule out the possibility that
subjects acquire "correlated" hypotheses about the rein-
forcement contingency that are incorrect from the experi-
menter's point of view but happen to produce response
profiles that are difficult to distinguish from those gener-
ated by the correct hypothesis. For example, suppose
subjects learn that resting their hand in a certain position
increases reinforcement rate. This could be a true experi-
enced contingency if that hand position was conducive to
a fast or slow response rate. Such an "incorrect" hypoth-
esis would generate behavior that was very similar to what
would be produced by the correct hypothesis, yet a
subject who reported hand position as the crucial variable
would be regarded by the experimenter as "unaware" of
the reinforcement contingency.
Although such a criticism is undoubtedly post hoc,
there is good evidence of subjects' behavior being under
the control of such correlated hypotheses. In the 1950s, a
number of studies asked subjects to generate words ad
libitum and established that the probability with which
they would produce, say, plural nouns was increased if
each such word was followed by the experimenter saying
"umhmm" (e.g., Greenspoon 1955); as with Svartdal's
(1991) experiment, this result occurred in subjects appar-
ently unable to report the reinforcement contingency.
However, in an elegant study, Dulany (1961) proved that
subjects were hypothesizing that reinforcement was con-
tingent on generating a word in the same semantic cate-
gory as the previous one. Although incorrect, this hypoth-
esis was correlated with the true one, in that if the subject
said "emeralds" and was reinforced, then staying in the
same semantic category meant they were more likely to
produce another plural noun ("rubies") than if they shifted
categories. Thus the subjects were perfectly aware of the
contingency that was controlling their behavior, namely,
the contingency between staying in the same semantic
category and reinforcement.
In sum, even ignoring possible insensitivity in the test
of verbal awareness, results such as Svartdal's (1991)
cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of unconscious
learning. Subjects may learn a rather different contin-
gency from that explicitly programmed by the experi-
menter, and the Information Criterion may hence fail to
be met. The problem is particularly worrisome in operant
studies because, by definition, the experimenter has little
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control over the subject's behavior and therefore over the
contingencies that may be present. In nonoperant tasks,
the problem can be avoided because the experimenter
can in principle eliminate all reinforcement contingencies
except the one of interest. For this reason it seems that
clear evidence for unconscious learning is likely to be
difficult to establish in instrumental learning tasks.
In contrast to such apparent dissociations between
learning and awareness, Shanks and Dickinson (1991)
have argued that there are a number of variables that
seem to have rather similar effects on performance assess-
ments of learning and on awareness. In two studies,
subjects performed a simple operant-learning task in
which pressing a key on a computer keyboard was related,
via a schedule of reinforcement, to a triangle flashing on
the screen. Subjects were exposed to a reinforcement
contingency in which they scored points whenever the
triangle flashed but lost points for each response, so that
they were encouraged to adapt their response rate to the
reinforcement schedule. Learning was demonstrated by
changes in subjects' rates of responding. As a measure of
awareness, subjects were asked to report on a scale from 0
to 100 what they thought was the relationship between
the response and the reinforcer.
Shanks and Dickinson (1991) found that response rate
was sensitive both to the degree of contiguity between the
response and reinforcer and to the degree of contingency
between them. At the same time, subjects' judgments
were equally sensitive to these factors. Furthermore,
certain judgmental illusions likewise manifested them-
selves in performance measures. For example, subjects
frequently judge an action and an outcome to be related
when in fact they are not. Shanks and Dickinson found
that this effect appears in performance measures such as
response rate as well as in verbal judgments. Of course,
the appearance of a bias in two behavioral measures
strongly suggests that they are mediated by a common
underlying process.
The notion that learning and awareness proceed in
tandem is corroborated to the extent that they are affected
in similar ways by various manipulations. Shanks and
Dickinson's results indicate that - at least for the two
important factors of contingency and contiguity - this is
exactly the case. Shanks (1993) discusses some further
apparent concordances.
The human operant-learning literature provides per-
haps the most convincing evidence that learning and
awareness are associated in simple learning tasks. A
wealth of data shows concordances between response rate
and verbal reports under different schedules of reinforce-
ment (e.g., Cataniaet al. 1989; Rosenfarb et al. 1992; see
also Skinner 1984b, and accompanying commentaries).
For instance, Rosenfarb et al. required subjects to press a
button either on a differential-reinforcement-of-low-rate
schedule, in which reinforcers were delivered for a re-
sponse provided that 5 sec had elapsed since the preced-
ing response, or on a fixed-ratio schedule in which eight
responses were required to earn a reinforcer. Rosenfarb
et al. found that subjects' verbal reports concerning the
programmed contingency accorded very well with the
actual contingencies. Furthermore, there was a strong
correlation between the time at which responding be-
came appropriate for a schedule and the time at which
verbal reports indicated awareness of the reinforcement
contingency operating in that schedule.
2.6.2. Complex instrumental control tasks. Several exper-
iments have investigated the relationship between learn-
ing and awareness in more complex instrumental learning
tasks where the subject has to learn to control an interac-
tive system. Again, the basic idea is as shown in Figure 1,
with some learning episode followed by an assessment of
awareness. In most of these tasks awareness at time t2 is
measured by verbally questioning the subject.
Berry and Broadbent (1984) conducted an influential
and widely cited experiment in which there was an
apparent dissociation between learning and awareness.
As in Hayes and Broadbent's (1988) study, one of the tasks
they used required subjects to interact with a computer
"person." On each trial, the subject entered an attitude
(e.g., polite) to the computer, which then responded with
its attitude (e.g., unfriendly). The subject's task was to try
to get the computer to be friendly. The computer's atti-
tude on each trial was a simple numerical function of the
subjects input on that trial and the computer's previous
attitude. Inclusion of the computer's attitude on the
previous trial makes the task quite a difficult one to learn.
Berry and Broadbent (1984, Experiment 1) found, not
surprisingly, that performance improved, with practice:
significantly more trials on target occurred during a
second block of 30 trials than during the first block.
However, scores on a structured questionnaire designed
to assess the subjects' reportable knowledge of the task
were no better after the second block than after the first
one. Hence, here we have apparent evidence that learn-
ing to perform a task can take place without any change in
awareness of the underlying structure of the task. Similar
results have been obtained in a number of other studies
(e.g., Berry & Broadbent 1987; 1990; Broadbent et al.
1986; Hayes & Broadbent 1988; Stanley et al. 1989).
On the other hand, a detailed examination by Sander-
son (1989) found evidence of associations rather than
dissociations between performance and reports. Sander-
son argued that because subjects often have complex prior
beliefs about the interactions within a large system, and
because these beliefs may be erroneous in a laboratory
version of the system, it is possible for their mental
models to undergo considerable revision without yielding
an overall improvement in accuracy. It is only with pro-
longed practice that mental models, and hence the verbal
reports based on them, begin to show noticeable im-
provement. Consistent with this, Sanderson was able to
obtain significant performance improvements at the same
time as weak improvements in the overall accuracy of
verbal reports in a complex transportation task, but she
showed that the detailed nature of the verbal reports was
changing very considerably.
A further experiment by Berry and Broadbent (1984)
found the converse of the previous dissociation, namely,
reportable knowledge improving without corresponding
improvements in task performance. One group simply
completed two sets of trials, while between the two sets
another group received detailed verbal instructions about
the nature of the input-output relationship. These instruc-
tions essentially represented a verbal description of the
equation governing the computer's attitude. When ques-
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tioned at the end of the experiment, subjects who had
received instructions outscored those who had not, yet
the groups were indistinguishable in terms of number of
trials on target. Thus a change in "awareness" (or at least a
change in reportable knowledge of the task) was not
accompanied by a change in task performance.
What are we to make of such dissociations? One possi-
bility is that it is not only possible for learning to proceed
without awareness, but in addition the system responsible
for implicit learning is quite independent of another
(explicit) system in which learning is accompanied by
awareness. Such a "systems" account would then be able
to explain why we can obtain double dissociations of the
sort reported by Berry and Broadbent (1984): learning to
perform the control task involves the implicit system, and
proceeds without awareness, while a change in awareness
involves the explicit system and can proceed without any
benefit in task performance.
While double dissociation results are certainly consis-
tent with the notion that there are two learning systems,
one conscious and the other unconscious, we feel that an
alternative account is equally feasible: there may be two
systems, both of which are conscious, but which encode
different types of knowledge. The basic problem is that
we do not know that the sort of knowledge the subjects in
Berry and Broadbent's experiments acquire when learn-
ing to perform the task is at all the same as the knowledge
they require to score well on the test of reportable
knowledge (i.e., the results may fail to meet the Informa-
tion Criterion). Suppose, for the sake of argument, that
good task performance simply depends on learning an
unrelated set of stimulus-response (S-R) pairs or instances
(evidence for such a possibility certainly exists; see
Cleeremans 1993b). It is then not hard to imagine that
although practice provides the subjects with more and
more knowledge of this sort, they might be hard pressed
to use such knowledge when faced with questions about
possible structural rules underlying the task. At the same
time, giving the subjects detailed instructions about the
task may improve their knowledge of the rules, and hence
their questionnaire scores, but might not transfer to
better performance on the task itself since S-R knowledge
is required for that. But of course the subjects' inability to
describe the rules underlying the task does not imply that
the S-R learning occurred without awareness: if they were
asked to report that knowledge, perhaps subjects would
be able to do so. In sum, there are ways of interpreting
such data that do not appeal to unconscious learning (see
Stanley et al. 1989, for an examination of some of the
alternative types of knowledge that subjects may encode).
A second problem concerns the sensitivity of the test of
awareness. Can we be certain that the questionnaire
procedure exhausts the subject's knowledge of the task?
Can we be confident that failure to express on the ques-
tionnaire any awareness of the nature of the task means
that the subjects were unaware at the time they were
learning? For example, one alternative strategy would be
to ask each subject to instruct a yoked "partner" in how to
perform the task. If the partners could then perform the
task as well as the original subjects, we would conclude
that the original subjects were in fact able to articulate all
their task knowledge. Such procedures have been used
with other learning procedures (e.g., Mathews et al.
1989, for grammar learning) and have proven highly
sensitive.
2.6.3. Conclusions. Instrumental learning experiments
arrange some relationship between the subject's actions
and certain outcomes. Implicit learning would be demon-
strated if learning, as indexed by changes in instrumental
behavior, occurred in the absence of awareness of the
reinforcement contingencies. Although some studies
have found that subjects seem unaware of the relevant
contingencies, reliance on verbal report means that the
Sensitivity Criterion is unlikely to have been met. Fur-
thermore, because the experimenter necessarily relin-
quishes a certain degree of experimental control in an
instrumental learning task, it is difficult to rule out the
possibility that the subject is responding on the basis of a
correlated hypothesis, in which case the Information
Criterion is violated. Finally, even ignoring these consid-
erations, a surprisingly large number of studies have
documented impressive concordances between behavior
and awareness.
2.7. Learning and awareness In serial reaction time
tasks
Nissen and Bullemer (1987) and Lewicki et al. (1987)
introduced a simple and ingenious technique, the serial
RT task, in an attempt to demonstrate unconscious learn-
ing. In Nissen and Bullemer's version, a stimulus is
presented on each trial in one of four locations (A-D) and
the subject simply has to press the button corresponding
to that location as fast as possible. The subject is given
instructions appropriate for a typical choice RT task, but
in fact there is a sequence underlying the selection of the
stimulus on each trial. The question is, can subjects learn
the sequence without being aware of it? With respect to
Figure 1, the subject is presented with a series of learning
trials in which there are predictive relationships between
stimuli. These are accompanied by both a concurrent
assessment of learning (RT) and a later assessment of
awareness.
Some of the most compelling evidence for unconscious
learning using this technique comes from a later study by
Willingham et al. (1989); this study is worth considering
in some detail because of the heavy reliance placed upon
it in recent discussions of conscious and unconscious
processing (e.g., Velmans 1991). In their first experiment,
Willingham et al. s subjects performed a 4-choice RT task.
The actual sequence of signals was DBCACBDCBA,
which repeated many times with no break between cy-
cles. Subjects' RT improved across a total of 400 trials. To
see whether this improvement represented knowledge of
the sequence or general nonspecific speedup, Will-
ingham et al. compared the speedup of their subjects to
that obtained in a group of subjects from the earlier study
by Nissen and Bullemer (1987) for whom there had been
no structured sequence; for these control subjects, target
location was random from trial to trial, except that the
same location never occurred on consecutive trials.
The improvement in RT was significantly greater in the
sequence group than in the control group, apparently
indicating that sequence learning had occurred. Further-
more, this was still true for subjects who subsequently
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reported no awareness of the existence of a sequence
during the RT trials.
2.7.1. Problem of suitable control group. Although such
results suggest the possibility of unconscious learning,
there are a number of significant problems with such
experiments. First, the demonstration of sequence learn-
ing has typically involved one of the following two com-
parisons: (1) a comparison (e.g., Willingham et al. 1989)
between a group exposed to the sequence and one for
whom the stimulus on each trial is chosen at random (with
the constraint that stimuli never repeat on consecutive
trials), or (2) a within-subjects comparison (e.g., Hartman
et al. 1989) between performance at the end of a long
period of exposure to the sequence and performance on a
subsequent block of trials where the stimuli are chosen at
random, again with the constraint that stimuli never
repeat on consecutive trials. The problem with both of
these comparisons is that performance can differ between
the sequence and random trials without the subject hav-
ing any knowledge - implicit or otherwise - of the
sequence.
As a moment's reflection reveals, faster responses on
the DBCACBDCBA sequence compared with a random
sequence might simply be due to response biases devel-
oping during exposure to the sequence. The stimuli are
not equally frequent (B and C occur three times, D and A
twice) in the 10-trial sequence. Thus in the sequence, but
not in the random conditions, the subject is to some
degree able to predict which stimuli are most probable, a
fact that - as has been demonstrated extensively (see
Broadbent 1971) - will allow fast responses to develop.
Clearly, the appropriate comparison is with a group of
subjects who receive a "pseudorandom" series con-
strained to have the same number of each of stimuli A, B,
C, and D per 10 trials as appear in the sequence proper,
and in which stimuli never repeat on consecutive trials.
Such an experiment was reported by Shanks et al. (1994).
One group of subjects was presented with the normal
sequence, another with the pseudorandom series, and a
third with a "truly random" sequence, in which again
there was the constraint that stimuli never repeated on
consecutive trials. The stimuli were dots arranged in a
horizontal row and the general procedure followed that of
Willingham et al. (1989).
After 400 RT trials, subjects in the sequence group
were classified on the basis of a structured interview as
having no knowledge of the sequence, some knowledge,
or full knowledge. The prediction was that if the no-
knowledge subjects had indeed learned something about
the sequence, they should have speeded up more than
the pseudorandom subjects. In all but the truly random
group the RT difference between the first and fourth
block of 100 trials was significantly greater than zero. The
normal-sequence/full-knowledge group speeded up
more than any of the others; the difference between the
normal-sequence/full-knowledge and pseudorandom
groups confirms that the normal-sequence/full knowl-
edge subjects had indeed learned something about the
sequence. However, there was no significant difference
between the normal sequence/no-knowledge and pseu-
dorandom groups, though both speeded up more than
subjects exposed to the truly random series. Thus, we
suggest that with Willingham et al. s stimuli and proce-
dure, most if not all of the supposedly implicit learning in
the normal-sequence/no-knowledge group was simply
due to the development o(f response biases reflecting
knowledge of the frequencies of the different stimuli.
As a consequence, Willingham et al.'s experiment fails
to satisfy the Information Criterion. The subjects may
have been unable to articulate information about the
sequence verbally simply because they were not learning
(in any sense) about the sequence. Instead, they were
learning about the frequencies with which the different
stimuli occurred. This is information they may, if asked,
have been able to report.
2.7.2. Prediction tests as measures of awareness. The
second problem is that, even ignoring the above consider-
ations, we cannot rely just on the subjects' informal
reports as assessments of their state of awareness some
seconds or even minutes previously. Two somewhat dif-
ferent strategies have been advocated with regard to
using more sensitive tests of awareness, namely, recogni-
tion and prediction tests. We discuss recognition tests in
the next section. Prediction tests, introduced by Nissen
and Bullemer (1987), require the subject to try to predict
the next element of the sequence; such a test was used by
Willingham et al. (1989) in addition to their verbal report
test. After the RT phase of their experiment, Willingham
et al. instructed subjects to try to predict on each trial
where the stimulus would next appear, with no require-
ment for rapid responses. Subjects simply chose response
keys on each trial until they picked the correct one, at
which point they would then try to predict the next
stimulus. Across many blocks of this prediction task, the
subject again has the opportunity to learn the sequence.
Evidence for explicit knowledge of the rule appears as
savings (compared with the control group) in the number
of trials required to learn the sequence in the prediction
task.3
The rationale behind the prediction task is that if
subjects are instructed to try to predict events and are
able to do so with above-chance accuracy, this is evidence
of conscious knowledge, because their predictions must
be based on conscious expectancies. As this task requires
the subject to act on a conscious expectancy concerning
which stimulus will appear next, it is apparently a test of
awareness of elements of the sequence. This contrasts
with the RT task, in which they have to respond as fast as
possible to the current target. The prediction task is a
good one in that it is irrelevant whether or not the
subjects believe that their performance in the RT phase
was being affected by the sequence (indeed, they may not
even be able consciously to report having detected a
sequence). All that matters is whether any evidence of
savings emerges in the prediction task, for, according to
the reasoning behind the task, such savings must be due
to conscious information about the sequence.
More to the point, failure at the prediction task would
demonstrate a subject's inability to draw consciously on
. information about the sequence, thereby supporting the
contention that the information indeed is implicit. It is
important to drawing such a conclusion that the predic-
tion task satisfies the Sensitivity Criterion where verbal
reports did not. The retrieval cues for the prediction task
are virtually identical to those of the reaction time task.
Hence we now have two tests that are almost identical,
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but in one the subject's performance (i.e., RT) is mea-
sured and in the other awareness is assessed. This very
much follows the rationale of recent experiments on
unconscious perception (e.g., Merikle & Reingold 1992),
where the test of awareness and the test of perception are
designed to differ in little more than the instructions
given to subjects. Although the temporal arrangement of
stimuli and responses is different in the two tasks, and the
response metrics are quite different, the prediction task
nonetheless represents an interesting new procedure for
assessing awareness.
What are the results obtained from studies using the
prediction task? Willingham et al. (1989, Experiment 1)
discovered that subjects they had classified as unaware on
the basis of their verbal reports not only speeded up in the
RT phase but also, according to Willingham et al., showed
no evidence of awareness as assessed by the prediction
task. Such a result appears to provide quite compelling
evidence of implicit learning, even if Shanks et al.'s (1994)
data suggest that learning probably involved frequency
rather than sequence information. It is important to note
that this dissociation of RT speedup and prediction perfor-
mance only applies to subjects who have been selected as
unaware on the basis of their verbal reports. Across all
subjects (regardless of their verbally reported awareness),
RT speedup and prediction performance tend to be
closely associated, as experiments by Cleeremans and
McClelland (1991) and Perruchet and Amorim (1992)
have shown.
Willingham et al. compared the performance of their
normal sequence/no-knowledge subjects in the predic-
tion task with that of a "no-training" group who had not
received the RT phase at all. This comparison was the
critical evidence that the sequence learning in the
normal-sequence/no-knowledge subjects was implicit.
However, there are three problems with these results.
First, although Willingham et al. claimed that there was
no evidence of savings on the prediction task in their
"no-explicit-knowledge" subjects, close inspection of
their data reveals that these subjects did perform at a
better level than naive subjects, though not significantly
so. Over each of the first six sets of 10 trials of the
prediction task, performance was better in the normal-
sequence/no-explicit-knowledge group than in the con-
trol group by about 5% in each set (Willingham et al.
1989, Fig. 3). On the first block of trials, the normal-
sequence/no-explicit-knowledge . group scored 42.6%
correct and the control group 38.7%. Although small,
this trend is as much evidence for savings as it is for a
dissociation between awareness and learning. A similar
conclusion may be drawn for the data reported by Hart-
man et al. (1989), where small but consistent savings are
also apparent.
Second, Perruchet and Amorim (1992) pointed out that
Willingham et al. did not instruct their subjects that the
stimulus sequence in the prediction phase would be the
same as that in the RT phase. Hence subjects may not
have been maximally motivated to show transfer savings
in the prediction task. The third and final problem is that
Shanks et al. (1994), in their replication and extension of
Willingham et al.'s study, obtained savings that were of a
statistically significant magnitude. Shanks et al.'s normal-
sequence/no-knowledge subjects performed much better
(mean 5.7 correct predictions) than the no-training con-
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trol subjects (mean 2.7) across the first 10 trials of the
prediction phase, indicating that at least some of the
knowledge they had acquired in the RT phase but were
unable to report verbally was available for transfer to the
prediction task. In sum, we conclude that the Willingham
et al. study has failed to establish unconscious sequence
learning.
A number of other studies have also used the sequence-
learning task. Several of these have adopted Willingham
et al.'s procedure of classifying some subjects as unaware
on the basis of their verbal reports and then examining
their prediction task performance. Others have sought to
obtain different dissociations between RT speedup and
prediction performance. Whatever the strategy used, we
suggest that claims for implicit learning in these studies
(e.g., Cohen et al. 1990; Hartman et al. 1989; Howard &
Howard 1989; Knopman 1991; Lewicki et al. 1987;
Lewicki et al. 1988; Nissen & Bullemer 1987; Nissen et al.
1987; Stadler 1989) are difficult to interpret for many of
the reasons we have raised concerning Willingham et al.'s
experiment. These other studies either (1) fail to show
that subjects have acquired any sequence knowledge in
the RT phase, (2) show small but consistent trends toward
savings in the prediction task in supposedly unaware
subjects, (3) present control subjects in the prediction
task with random rather than pseudorandom sequences,
or (4) do not provide feedback in the prediction test and
hence run the risk of inducing forgetting of the sequence,
which will lead to an underestimation of conscious knowl-
edge. Caution suggests that these studies do not warrant
the conclusion of reliable sequence learning in the ab-
sence of awareness.
Rather than reviewing all of these studies, we consider
two widely cited ones (Lewicki et al. 1988; Stadler 1989)
that illustrate some of the problems. Lewicki et al. (1988)
presented subjects with blocks of trials that were ar-
ranged into sequences of five trials. On each trial a target
appeared in one of the four quadrants of the computer
screen and the subject had to respond by pressing the key
appropriate to that quadrant. RTs were collected from a
total of 4,080 experimental trials experienced by each
subject. On the first two trials target location was random,
except that the target was never displayed twice in the
same place. Target location on trial 3 was determined by
what had happened on trials 1 and 2. If the movement on
the first two trials had been horizontal, then the move-
ment from trial 2 to trial 3 was vertical; if it was vertical,
then the next was diagonal; and if it was diagonal, the next
was horizontal.
Similarly, target location on trial 4 depended on target
locations on trials 2 and 3, and target location on trial 5
depended on its locations on trials 3 and 4. The net effect
was that target location on trials 3, 4, and 5 was entirely
predictable from the underlying rules, but locations on
trials 1 and 2 were random. Hence if the subjects were
indeed learning something about the rules, this should
have manifested itself in a significantly greater reduction
in RTs across blocks on trials 3,4, and 5 than on trials 1 and
2, and this is exactly what Lewicki et al. found (in fact,
they took as their dependent measure the number of
correct responses with latencies less than 400 msec). Also,
when the rules were changed toward the end of training,
reaction times increased on trials 3, 4, and 5 but not on
trials 1 and 2.
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Lewicki et al.'s (1988) subjects could apparently report
next to nothing about the rules determining target loca-
tion. "None of the subjects mentioned anything even
close to the manipulated pattern of exposures" (p. 33),
although eight of the nine subjects did seem to be aware
that their performance had dropped when the rules were
changed. Lewicki et al. concluded that the subjects had
learned the rules determining target locations on trials 3—
5 implicitly or unconsciously.
Perruchet et al. (1990), however, disputed Lewicki et
al.'s (1988) conclusions. The criticism is that the set of
possible events that could occur on trials 3-5 was more
constrained than the set of events that could occur on
trials 1 and 2. By analyzing the rules that determined the
permissible transitions from one trial to another, Per-
ruchet et al. were able to show in their replication of
Lewicki et al.'s experiment that speedup in RTon trials 3—
5 relative to trials 1 and 2 was mainly due to relative
speedup only on trials 4 and 5; furthermore, it was almost
entirely due to two factors. First, on trials 1 and 2, but not
trials 3-5, there were some occasions when the stimulus
moved back to a location from which it had just come;
these backwards movements led to a slowing of RTs
simply because they increased the unpredictability of the
movement. Second, on trials 1 and 2 there were infre-
quent horizontal movements, which again led to a slowing
of RTs. On trials 4 and 5 horizontal movements were not
permissible. Rather than learn rules such as, "If the
movement from trial 1 to trial 2 was horizontal, then the
next movement will be vertical," subjects need only have
learned that the possible transitions had widely different
overall probabilities. Low-probability transitions tended
to occur on trials 1 and 2 and hence led to slower RTs.
Clearly, Lewicki et al.'s data fail to show that the
knowledge that subjects could articulate in their verbal
reports was in any way poorer than the knowledge that
underlay their RT speedup. This fails to meet the Informa-
tion Criterion and hence Lewicki et al.'s belief that
knowledge of the composition rules was necessary for RT
improvement is almost certainly not correct. Instead,
relative RT speedup is simply due to subjects' learning that
certain movements of the target occurred with low proba-
bility. As Perruchet et al. say, "The fact that subjects do not
articulate any of the composition rules no longer applies if
improvement in performance turns out to be unrelated to
this kind of knowledge" (1990, p. 497). Furthermore,
"Subjects' reports on the frequency of occurrence of
particular target transitions would have been rejected as
irrelevant to the actual manipulation" (p. 512).
Perruchet etal. did not assess their subjects verbally, but
on the basis of Lewicki et al.'s results we may assume that
on such a test they would also be classified as unaware.
However, a verbal report test assessing experimenter-
defined sequence knowledge may fail the Sensitivity
Criterion. Perruchet etal. therefore used a prediction test
in their study to see whether the subjects were indeed
unaware. Toward the end of the experiment, they required
one group of subjects to predict where they thought the
target was due to appear. These predictions only had to be
made intermittently, because there were between 4 and 11
normal RT trials between successive prediction trials. On
such a trial, a question mark appeared in the center of the
screen and subjects pressed the button matching the
location of the target that seemed most probable.
Perruchet et al. found that subjects performed at signif-
icantly better than chance levels on the prediction trials.
On trials 3, 4, and 5 they averaged 55.6% correct predic-
tions, against a chance value of 33.3% (which assumes that
subjects have learned - explicitly - that the target never
appears in the same location on consecutive trials). On
trials 1 and 2, only 29.7% of predictions were correct. If
we take prediction responses to be conscious "reports" by
the subjects of their expectancies about target location,
then these results contradict Lewicki et al.'s (1988) claim
that their study supported a dissociation between implicit
and explicit knowledge. On the contrary, subjects seemed
just as able to "report" target location as they were to show
selective RT improvements.
We have already described Lewicki et al.'s (1987) exper-
iments in section 2.3.2 and the ways in which they failed
to meet either the Information or the Sensitivity Crite-
rion. Briefly, the verbal report is likely to be an insensitive
measure, and subjects were likely to be using a simpler
form of knowledge to perform the task than Lewicki et al.
considered. Stadler's (1989) replication is worth consider-
ing, though, because it made a concerted attempt to meet
these criteria. Each trial consisted of the presentation of a
target item in one of the four quadrants of a computer
screen, designated A-D. The choice of target location on
each trial was nonrandom, and the question was whether
the subjects would be able to detect this nonrandomness.
Subjects were presented with sequences of seven trials,
with rules constructed so that target location on the
seventh trial could be predicted from its location on trials
1, 3, 4, and 6. On each of the first six trials, the digit 6
appeared on its own in one of the quadrants of the screen,
but on trial 7 (the "complex" trial), it was embedded in a
display containing 36 digits. Reaction time on the seventh
trial was the measure of interest. Again, the rules specify-
ing target location were deterministic: thus, if the target
appeared in locations C, A, D, and B on trials 1,3, 4, and 6
respectively, then on trial 7 the target would be in loca-
tion A.
Stadler (1989) repeated Lewicki et al.'s (1987) finding
that RTs on the target trials decreased significantly across
a large number of complex trials. To assess awareness,
Stadler used a prediction task in which subjects were free
to use whatever knowledge they had acquired, be it of the
rules or of fragments of sequences, to predict target
location. The task thus meets the Information Criterion,
and because it reinstates much of the learning context,
should also go a good deal of the way toward establishing
equal sensitivity to conscious information in the aware-
ness and performance tasks. In the prediction task,
Stadler presented each of the four subjects with 48 se-
quences of seven trials, with target location on the sev-
enth (complex) trial being determined by its location on
the first, third, fourth, and fifth of the simple trials. On
the complex trial, instead of presenting the target and
distractors and requiring the subjects to locate the dis-
tractor as quickly as possible, Stadler presented a ques-
tion mark in each possible location, and the subjects had
to guess in which quadrant the target would appear. No
feedback was given.
Stadler found that the four subjects made correct pre-
dictions on, respectively, 13, 11, 11, and 11 of the 48
sequences, where chance performance was 12/48.
Clearly, there is no hint here of transfer to the prediction
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task. But in the absence of feedback on the prediction
sequences, it seems to us that there is a very substantial
likelihood that over the 48 test sequences, subjects would
have forgotten a large part of whatever knowledge under-
lay their RT performance. Without feedback, 48 se-
quences (including 288 simple trials) represents a vast
amount of interfering information. To be fair, Stadler
could not, with his design, have given feedback, because
better-than-chance performance would have been ascrib-
able equally to savings from the RT stage and to new
learning of the sequences. For this reason, designs in
which relative savings in the unaware group are compared
to those in a novel control group are much to be preferred;
they allow a sensitive savings test to be administered
without the problem of the forgetting of the sequences.
Alternatively, Stadler could have interspersed his predic-
tion trials throughout further RT trials in order to offset
any forgetting on the former. At any rate, acceptance of
the null hypothesis (of no transfer to the prediction trials)
would be better warranted if we knew that there was no
hint of transfer on the first few trials, but Stadler did not
present these data.
In the meantime, we suggest that cautious readers
should not interpret these results, or any of the sequence
learning results we have reviewed, as convincing evi-
dence for learning without awareness.
2.7.3. Recognition tests. As an alternative to prediction
tests, several researchers have argued that an appropriate
and sensitive test of the subject's explicit knowledge -
particularly if that knowledge is fragmentary - is to use a
recognition memory test. Using the Nissen and Bullemer
(1987) task, Perruchet and Amorim (1992), for instance,
presented subjects in the test phase with 4-trial se-
quences such as DBCA, which had either been part of the
training sequence or not, and required them to respond
exactly as they had in the study phase prior to making
recognition decisions about the sequences. The results
indicated that the old and new sequences could be dis-
criminated, and furthermore, the recognition scores cor-
related extremely highly (r = 0.821) with RTs. On this
basis, there is little evidence that sequence learning was
unconscious. However, Perruchet and Amorim did not
divide their subjects into aware and unaware groups, and
it remains possible that their subjects included an un-
aware subgroup in whom recognition performance was at
chance.
More interesting are data reported by Willingham et
al. (1993). Using the standard 4-stimulus task, one-half of
the subjects saw a random sequence and one-half saw a
16-trial repeating sequence, equated for overall stimulus
frequencies. After the learning phase all subjects were
given a detailed verbal questionnaire consisting of five
questions and were also given a recognition test, in which
five 16-trial sequences were shown, and the subjects had
to rate how likely it was that each sequence had been the
one used in the RT phase. The mean rating for the
distractor sequences was subtracted from that given to the
target sequence to yield a recognition measure.
Consistent with the idea that sequence learning was
unconscious, Willingham et al. (1993) found only small
and nonreliable correlations between the awareness mea-
sures (the verbal and recognition measures) and RT
speedup in the study phase. This result also confirms, of
course, that the recognition measure indexes something
different from the performance measure. However, when
Willingham et al. examined their individual subjects'
data, they found that only two out of 45 sequence subjects
could be classified as genuinely unaware of the sequence:
the remainder all scored better than the median of the
random subjects on one or more of the awareness mea-
sures. Thus it is only for these two subjects that we have
any evidence of unawareness. When the RTs of these
subjects were examined, they did indeed improve signifi-
cantly more across trials than the random subjects, but
interpretation is complicated by the fact that they started
with abnormally slow RTs and ended the training phase
with RTs similar to the random subjects. Finally, as
Perruchet and Gallego (1993) point out, in a sample of 45
subjects, two of them might be erroneously misclassified
as unaware simply because of unreliability in the aware-
ness test. Obviously, a much larger sample is needed
before strong conclusions can be drawn.
2.7.4. What is learned in sequence-learning experiments?
Perhaps it should come as little surprise that, in general,
RT performance and awareness tend to correlate (see
Perruchet & Amorim 1992). Indeed, it is well established
that in choice RT tasks, when subjects make a correct
prediction about which stimulus will appear on the next
trial, their RT on that trial will be much faster than if they
had made an incorrect prediction (e.g., Simon & Craft
1989). But what exactly is the nature of the knowledge that
subjects acquire in a sequence-learning experiment? In
attempting to answer this question, perhaps we can bet-
ter understand why there is such a temptation to regard
the learning as unconscious.
In the studies we have described, the experimenter
arranges that the location of the target is governed by a
complex rule or set of rules. For example, in Lewicki et
al.'s (1987) and Stadler's (1989) experiments, one of the
rules says that if the target appeared in locations C, A, D,
and B on trials 1, 3, 4, and 6, respectively, then on trial 7
the target will be in location A. In some studies (e.g.,
Lewicki et al. 1988) it appears that the experimenter is
assuming that significant learning in the RT stage must
occur because subjects learn those rules in their entirety.
But the Information Criterion cautions us to examine
closely whether RT speedup can be due solely to learning
of the entire rule: Might performance not simply be due
to learning of more fragmentary information? In the
Lewicki et al. (1987) study, might RT improvement not
arise just from the subjects' learning contingencies be-
tween, say, target locations on trials 4 and 6 and target
location on trial 7?
The best evidence to date suggests that learning frag-
ments of the training sequences is probably sufficient to
explain the available sequence-learning data (see Per-
ruchet, in press). Cleeremans and McClelland (1991,
Experiment 1) were able to compare RTs to targets that
could only be predicted by knowing the previous three
elements of the sequence. They found a reliable differ-
ence between RTs to targets that conformed to the rules
compared to those that did not, indicating that subjects
could indeed maintain three items of temporal context.
However, no evidence emerged that they could maintain
four items of context. If such a result is generally valid -
though the size of the temporal context that can be
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maintained is likely to be influenced by the exact experi-
mental procedure - it would be very unlikely that
Lewicki et al.'s (1987) subjects could learn rules requiring
knowledge of six items of context.
Cleeremans and McClelland (1991, Experiment 2) ob-
tained more direct evidence of the constraints on the
amount of context subjects can maintain. They set up a
task in which the location of the stimulus on a target trial
could only be predicted by knowing where the stimulus
had appeared four (and sometimes more) trials previ-
ously. Confirming the results of their first experiment, no
evidence emerged that subjects could learn this long-
range contingency, even when presented with a massive
60,000 trials. Instead, subjects appeared to be able to
predict target location by reference only to the last one,
two, or three locations. Thus, asking subjects to report
entire rules risks falling foul of the Information Criterion.
2.7.5. Objections to prediction and recognition tests.
Given the tentative conclusion we have reached, namely,
that prediction tests do in general reveal savings and that
recognition tests so far have not yielded clear dissociations
from RT speedup, defenders of unconscious learning
might say that these tests are not truly tests of awareness.
In all probability, they might argue, subjects do not
"know" why they press certain keys in the prediction task;
perhaps their fingers just get pulled toward certain keys.
According to some of Lewicki et al.'s (1988, p. 33) sub-
jects, describing their RT performance, "their fingers
were doing the job by themselves." Perhaps this happens
as much for prediction as it does for the RT task. Similarly,
perhaps subjects say "old" in a recognition test not be-
cause they are aware that the test sequence was part of the
study sequence but because of perceptual fluency (see
Perruchet & Amorim 1992). As we have mentioned al-
ready, there is no inherent reason why any behavioral
measure should be influenced exclusively by conscious
processes. In the language of the subliminal perception
literature, maybe these tasks are not exclusive (Reingold
& Merikle 1988).
If the prediction and recognition tests are not pure
measures of awareness, then any conclusion based on
them - e.g., that supposedly unaware subjects are in fact
aware of the sequence - is called into question. But there
are at least three reasons to doubt that unconscious
processes do play a significant role. First, remember that
in the prediction task, a response is required that is
different from the one that was performed in the RT task.
In the prediction task subjects respond to the next stim-
ulus, whereas in the RT task they respond to the current
stimulus. So, if the claim that prediction responses are
under unconscious control is correct, subjects would
make erroneous responses on the prediction task. This
does not seem to be the case to any significant degree.
Second, if some unconscious process is contributing to
recognition performance, it seems that RTs should be
faster in the recognition test for sequences that were part
of the original sequence than for those that were not.
Perruchet and Amorim (1992) were unable to find any
evidence for this. Finally, Willingham et al. (1993) used
three different versions of the recognition task. In one,
subjects responded to the test sequences just as they had
in the study phase, and then gave recognition ratings.
Other subjects merely observed the stimulus sequence
prior to making a recognition judgment, and a third
subgroup saw the sequence presented in the form of the
digits 1-4 rather than in terms of screen locations. The
latter two procedures should rule out perceptual fluency
as the basis of judgments, yet Willingham et al. observed
no difference between the three tests. We believe this
strongly suggests that the recognition test is a genuine
measure of awareness of the sequence.
Of course, if the prediction task and recognition tests
cannot be treated as tests of awareness, we have no
recourse other than to examine the subject's verbal re-
ports as the only available index of explicit knowledge,
and this, we have argued, is unsatisfactory because it
precludes meeting the Sensitivity Criterion. Instead,
some authors have suggested that we should abandon the
narrow version of the dissociation paradigm that underlies
these implicit learning studies (see sect. 2.1) and try to
demonstrate qualitative differences between conscious
and unconscious learning. It could be argued that such a
difference would exist if the information that can be
expressed in performance (RTs) increases dramatically
across learning trials while the information available to
awareness only changes marginally. Awareness may not
have to be entirely absent. Thus, presumably, one might
say that subjects in the Willingham et al. (1989) experi-
ment were able to project more information in their RTs
than in their predictions (where the savings tended to be
only about 5%), and thus, even though prediction perfor-
mance was better than chance, this is still evidence for a
distinction between implicit and explicit learning. But
without measures of (1) the amount of information that is
transmitted when a subject shows an RT speedup of x
msec, and (2) the amount of information the subject is
transmitting when their prediction performance im-
proves by y%, it is very hard to assess such objections. We
have no model for how much information is being con-
veyed by these different measures (for discussion of the
same point, see Nelson 1978; Reingold & Merikle 1988).
It is exactly for this reason that one normally looks for
cases where awareness of some variable is absent but
performance is significantly affected by that variable,
because even if we have no formal description of informa-
tion, we know that a variable (which represents informa-
tion) is being conveyed in performance but not in reports.
For example, we would know that a variable such as the
predictability of a sequence is affecting RT but not re-
ports, and therefore RTs are conveying more information.
Thus it is impossible to invalidate the null hypothesis (that
performance and prediction convey the same amount of
information) unless something can be done to show that
more information is being conveyed in the implicit than in
the explicit measure.
2.7.6. Conclusions. Sequence-learning studies have used
prediction and recognition tasks as indices of awareness.
These tasks reproduce the stimulus context of the learn-
ing stage (hence addressing the Sensitivity Criterion), and
can be performed at above-chance levels, whether the
subjects' knowledge is of fragments or of the complete
sequence (hence meeting the Information Criterion).
However, contrary to claims that sequence learning is
unconscious, the results to date suggest that in most cases
subjects are aware of the relevant knowledge, and that
their knowledge consists of fragments of the training
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sequence. We believe that no convincing evidence of
implicit learning has yet emerged in sequential RT tasks;
nevertheless, this is a very promising field of research that
may in the future allow more positive conclusions.
3. Encoding instances versus inducing rules
In the introduction we raised two fundamental issues
concerning implicit learning: that of consciousness during
learning and the type of knowledge acquired. By crossing
these factors we obtain four hypothetical learning sys-
tems: unconscious instance/fragment learning, uncon-
scious rule learning, conscious instance/fragment learn-
ing, and conscious rule learning. This review has shown
that the evidence for unconscious learning of any sort is
highly questionable; we accordingly conclude that uncon-
scious learning is unsupported in general. It is time, then,
to turn to our second dimension for characterizing disso-
ciable learning systems, namely, the content of the ac-
quired knowledge, and to assess the rules versus in-
stances distinction within the domain of conscious,
explicit learning.
In the following discussion we use the term "implicit
learning tasks" to refer to the sorts of tasks reviewed in
section 2.
3.7. Evidence from studies of concept learning
Perhaps the most important conclusion from our discus-
sion so far is that performance in a variety of different tasks
can be well accounted for by reference to fragmentary
knowledge or knowledge of instances rather than to ab-
stract rules. In the present section we pursue this idea by
showing that to a large extent human performance in
more traditional concept-learning studies can also be well
understood in such terms. However, the concept learning
literature leads us also toward more compelling evidence
that people can genuinely learn rules. Thus we begin to
see a characteristic that does distinguish different learn-
ing systems: whether the knowledge acquired is of in-
stances or rules.
A view of concept learning that had been popular for
many years prior to the 1960s was that learning a concept
involves the acquisition of a rule specifying the features
necessary and sufficient for membership of that category.
However, when Rosch (1975) argued that for many natu-
ral categories it was impossible to specify the necessary
and sufficient features, and when Posner and Keele (1970)
showed that subjects could learn to classify random dot
patterns that had not been generated by deterministic
rules, research began to be dominated by the alternative
view that concepts are represented by prototypes. A
prototype is an abstraction from a set of training stimuli
that corresponds to their central tendency.
On the prototype view, category membership is deter-
mined simply by computing which of a series of stored
prototypes the test stimulus is closest to. As in the rule-
based account, in prototype theories the subject is as-
sumed to abstract something from the training stimuli and
not to retain information about those specific instances.
3.1.1. The role of instances. The view that the learning of a
concept could be based on little more than the encoding
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of the separate instances that fall under the concept began
to emerge in the late 1970s in the work of researchers such
as Lee Brooks and Douglas Medin. They observed that,
contrary to what would be expected on a prototype
account, subjects do appear to retain information about
training instances, in that studied instances can bias
subsequent classification decisions (e.g., Brooks 1978;
Homa et al. 1981; Malt 1989; Medin & Schaffer 1978). On
the basis of such findings, Medin and Schaffer (1978)
proposed that one component of a concept is simply a set
of memorized exemplars or instances.
Although Medin and Schaffer assumed that both in-
stance storage and prototype abstraction could occur
during the Teaming of a concept, subsequent studies have
shown that performance in a great many category-
learning studies can be understood in terms of instance
storage alone (for a historical review, see Medin & Florian
1992). We can illustrate the power of instance-storage
theories by considering the results of a study by Shin and
Nosofsky (1992), who examined category learning with
dot patterns. Shin and Nosofsky first performed a
multidimensional-scaling analysis on subjects'judgments
of pairwise similarity for the patterns, which yielded
coordinates in psychological space for each of the pat-
terns. Other subjects were then trained to classify some of
the patterns into three categories and, following that,
they were tested on their classification decisions for the
remaining patterns.
The instance view proposes that subjects memorize the
actual exemplars seen during training and base their
classifications on the similarity between a test item and
stored instances. Since Shin and Nosofsky knew the
psychological coordinates of all of the patterns, they were
able to compare subjects' decisions to test patterns with
the predictions of a model that assumed that classification
was determined solely by similarity to memorized in-
stances. They found a remarkable degree of concordance
between predicted and observed classifications, with over
95% of the variance in the observed classifications being
accounted for in a 1-parameter model. A prototype the-
ory, assuming that the training instances formed the basis
for an abstracted prototype, performed much more
poorly in predicting responses.
The implications of such results for implicit learning
cannot be overemphasized. The stimuli used in typical
categorization experiments are every bit as complex and
difficult to label verbally as are the stimuli used in
implicit learning experiments, so the powerful evidence
for instance storage that emerges from categorization
experiments should encourage us to take very seriously
the possibility that the encoding of instances is a major
factor in implicit learning experiments as well.
3.1.2. Evidence for rule induction. Despite the wealth of
evidence in favor of instance theories of concept learning,
we argue that it is also possible for people to classify
objects on the basis of a rule or hypothesis. As a partic-
ularly dramatic example, consider the evidence for a
difference between instance learning and rule learning in
the sexing of day-old chicks (Biederman & Shiffrar 1987).
It has been estimated that professional sexers, trained
with feedback on instances, require 2.4 months of solid
practice to reach 95% accuracy. However, naive subjects
trained on one simple rule immediately achieved 90%
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accuracy. Of course the simple rule misses the rare and
subtle exceptions that instance learning can provide, so
further accuracy gains will be difficult. On the other hand,
the initial difference in training time is immense.
Laboratory demonstrations of contrasts between rule
and instance learning have been provided in a number of
studies (e.g., Allen & Brooks 1991; Kemler Nelson 1984;
Nosofsky et al. 1989; Regehr & Brooks 1993; Smith &
Shapiro 1989; Ward & Scott 1987). Consider, for instance,
Nosofsky et al.'s (1989) Experiment 1. In this experiment,
the stimuli were semicircles with an interior radial line:
16 stimuli were constructed from the combination of four
sizes of semicircle (1 . . . 4) with four angles of inclination
of the radial line (1 . . . 4). In one condition, subjects
learned to classify three of the stimuli into category 1 and
four into category 2, and then were tested for their
transfer performance across the remaining nine stimuli.
The dependent measures were the overall probabilities
with which subjects placed each of the 16 stimuli into
categories 1 and 2.
Nosofsky et al. (1989) found that 97.9% of the variance
in these combined classification probabilities across sub-
jects could be accounted for by a quantitative model that
assumed that stored instances were the only basis on
which the decisions were made, an impressive fit that
confirms the conclusion of the Shin and Nosofsky (1992)
study. In addition, however, Nosofsky et al. compared
their model to several rule-based descriptions. Specifi-
cally, it would have been possible for subjects to learn the
categorization problem by inducing a rule for partitioning
the stimulus space into response regions. For instance,
one rule that would have correctly classified the training
stimuli was the rule: a stimulus is in category 2 if the value
of angle is 1, or the value of size is 1, or the value of angle
is 4; otherwise the stimulus is in category 1. Nosofsky et al.
constructed a variety of such set-theoretic rules, but
found that none of them fitted the overall classification
performance of the subjects nearly as well as their in-
stance model. From such data it would appear that sub-
jects rely on nothing more than stored representations of
the training items in classifying stimuli.
When they looked at the behavior of individual sub-
jects, however, Nosofsky et al. (1989, Experiment 1)
found that some subjects' classification responses con-
formed to patterns that were quite unlikely according to
an instance theory, and yet they matched fairly simple
rules. Thus, at the level of individual subjects, some
evidence for rule following rather than generalization to
stored instances did emerge. In their second experiment,
Nosofsky et al. chose two rules that could be used to
classify the stimuli accurately, and gave two different
groups of subjects explicit instructions to follow one of the
two rules in classifying the stimuli. Here, the instance
theory failed dramatically, accounting for only 82.4% and
40.9% of the variance in responses for the two groups. In
contrast, 99.5% and 93.6% of the variance in the subjects'
classifications in the two groups were accounted for by the
rules themselves. Similar results were obtained in their
Experiment 3, using a different set of stimuli. Thus, here
we have clear evidence that subjects are able to learn an
abstract rule and hence need not rely just on stored
instances.
An even more compelling demonstration of the inade-
quacy of pure instance storage comes from recognition
memory data that Nosofsky et al. collected during the test
phase of their experiments. Although in Experiment 1
subjects had no difficulty recognizing the old training
stimuli and discriminating them from new test stimuli,
when subjects were explicitly instructed to use a rule to
classify the stimuli in Experiment 2, no evidence
emerged that the subjects could remember which test
stimuli had been training stimuli. The implication of this
result is that these subjects had encoded nothing in the
training stage except the rule: they had not encoded any
of the instances. This remarkable finding shows that when
appropriate conditions are established, subjects can in-
deed learn an abstract rule from exposure to instances. Of
course, just because subjects had to be given rule-
following instructions in Nosofsky et al.'s studies before
they would actually engage in rule following does not
mean that this will always be necessary. In fact Nosofsky
et al.'s stimuli make rule following difficult in that the
stimuli do not readily lend themselves to verbal
descriptions.
Other compelling evidence for rule learning, from
tasks using more complex stimuli, has been reported by
Allen and Brooks (1991) and Regehr and Brooks (1993).
The rationale of the experiments was as follows: suppose
that subjects learn to classify stimuli in a situation where a
simple, perfectly predictive classification rule exists and
they are then tested on transfer items that vary in sim-
ilarity to the training stimuli. Observed behavior with the
transfer items can be of two contrasting types: (1) transfer
items similar to old items from the opposite category (bad
transfer items) may be classified as quickly and as accu-
rately as items similar to old items from the same category
(good transfer items), or (2) the bad transfer items may be
classified much less rapidly and accurately than the good
transfer items.
The first case above would be consistent with classifica-
tion being determined by the speeded application of a
rule. In this case all that matters is whether the rule
assigns the transfer item to one category or the other.
Whether the item is similar or not to a training instance,
and whether that instance was in the same or a different
category, should be immaterial. On the other hand, the
second outcome described above would be consistent
with categorization on the basis of similarity to training
instances, and there would be no need to cite a rule as
being part of the classification process.
Allen and Brooks (1991) and Regehr and Brooks (1993)
obtained evidence that both sorts of outcome can occur,
depending on the type of stimuli used and the precise
nature of the task. They trained subjects to classify ani-
mals into two categories. The animals varied in terms of
five binary-valued dimensions: body shape, spots, leg
length, neck length, and number of legs, but only three of
the dimensions were relevant. In some experiments sub-
jects were explicitly told the classification rule (e.g.,
category 1 is defined by the conjunction of long legs,
angular body, and spots). Evidence for rule learning - no
difference in latency or accuracy in classifying a new item
similar to a training item and in the same category versus a
new item similar to a training items but in the opposite
category - was related to a number of factors. For exam-
ple, rule learning was more likely to be the controlling
process when subjects were actually told the rule prior to
the task, although this was not a necessary condition. It
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also depended on the nature of the stimuli used: highly
individual stimuli tended to elicit instance-based rather
than rule-based classification, and stimuli composed of
interchangeable features tended to elicit more rule-based
classification behavior.
Additional factors that appear to determine the balance
between rule learning and instance learning have been
investigated. Smith and Shapiro (1989) found that rule
learning was less likely when subjects had to perform a
secondary task during the learning stage and when the
training stage was conducted as an incidental learning
task. Smith and Kemler Nelson (1984) found that rule
learning was less likely in a speeded than an unspeeded
learning task, and also that there seems to be a develop-
mental trend in rule learning: in situations where adults
classify according to a rule, children often do so on the
basis of similarity to training instances. In sum, laboratory
studies have established the reality of rule- or hypothesis-
based concept learning and have begun to identify the
circumstances that determine when it predominates.
3.2. Rule Induction from artificial grammars
In our earlier discussion of artificial grammar learning, we
suggested that performance could be well understood on
the assumption that subjects principally learn about
whole strings (instances) and about legal substrings. Al-
though some evidence for abstraction exists (e.g., Alt-
mann et al., in press), such a view denies that knowledge
of abstract grammatical rules plays a major part in perfor-
mance. However, when subjects are told prior to seeing
them that the strings are rule governed, and particularly if
they are taught something about finite state grammars
(Mathews et al. 1989; Reber et al. 1980), a pattern of
results rather different from that seen under normal
conditions occurs. Under these conditions, subjects ap-
pear to engage in a very explicit form of rule induction or
hypothesis testing that produces reportable rules. The
dissociation between performance and verbal reports
does not occur under these conditions.
Reber et al. (1980) extensively instructed subjects on
the nature of finite state grammars before, during, or after
presenting the training strings. When instruction oc-
curred before training, subjects performed well on the
grammaticality task but showed evidence of having
learned unrepresentative rules: rather than random er-
rors from guessing, their errors were consistent. Nonran-
,dom mistakes fit with the idea that subjects were trying
out various hypotheses in turn. At test time subjects will
have some hypothesis for evaluating test strings, but it
may be incorrect and therefore produce consistent errors.
Further supporting this claim, Reber et al. found that a
well-ordered presentation of training strings, making the
structure of the underlying grammar more salient, as-
sisted learning only in the case where the explicit instruc-
tions occurred early in training. The conclusion is that the
explicit instructions promote an explicit hypothesis test-
ing strategy, and that well-ordered string presentation
was particularly helpful for this learning strategy.
Mathews et al. (1989) found that the nature of the
grammar also affected subjects' ability to learn it via an
explicit strategy. Finite state grammars are difficult to
learn explicitly: instructions that promote hypothesis
testing but provide no information about the nature of
grammar rules, such as instructions to "find the rules," fail
to produce good learning (Perruchet & Pacteau 1990;
Reber et al. 1980). Indeed, Mathews et al. found that
subjects given such instructions learned no better than'
subjects given incidental learning instructions. Other
types of grammars, however, are easier to learn explicitly.
For example, subjects in Mathews et al.'s study readily
acquired a biconditional grammar in which strings con-
sisted of two sets of four letters, with three rules mapping
the letters between the sets. Mathews et al. observed far
superior learning in subjects instructed to search for rules
than in subjects given incidental learning instructions.
Moreover, in contrast to subjects given rule-searching
instructions, subjects given incidental instructions did
not acquire this grammar at all, a result that strongly
argues for the existence of independent learning systems.
How does explicit hypothesis testing differ from the
memory-based processing that is the norm in implicit
learning paradigms? Smith et al. (1992) compiled a set of
eight characteristics of rule following behavior. For exam-
ple, a defining feature is that rules ought to apply equally
well to familiar, unfamiliar, and abstract problems or
stimuli (as in Allen & Brooks 1991; Regehr & Brooks
1993). Smith et al. review numerous experiments that
demonstrate subjects following rules such as modus
ponens and the law of large numbers.
Turning to rule learning, Smith et al. point to subjects'
learning protocols and their ability to report intermediate
hypotheses as evidence for rule learning. Indeed, explicit
hypothesis testing presumes that the hypotheses are
conscious and reportable. Protocols indicate that generat-
ing and testing these hypotheses is a slow, labored, and
conscious process. Lea and Simon (1979) describe a gen-
eral framework for understanding the cognitive processes
involved. Hypothesis testing, they claim, is a form of
problem solving involving search through two problem
spaces: the space of hypotheses and the space of experi-
ments or instances to test hypotheses.
Studies of series completion, a task that is similar to
artificial grammar learning, provide a clear example of the
characteristics of the hypothesis-testing strategy (Ko-
tovsky & Simon 1979). In this task, subjects are shown a
single string of letters that contains a short repeating
pattern (e.g., MABMCD) and are asked to continue the
series. Their protocols clearly indicate that they cycle
through gathering evidence from the string and generat-
ing hypotheses to fit the data. In addition, subjects'
occasional mistakes are consistent with their last-
considered, but incorrect, hypothesis. They will then
produce consistent errors as did subjects in the grammar
learning studies (Reber et al. 1980). Finally, unusual
hypotheses are difficult to generate and therefore un-
likely to be discovered; this effect has been shown in
several hypothesis-testing paradigms (Bruner et al. 1956;
Klahr et al. 1990; Klayman & Ha 1989; Wason 1968). This
unsurprising effect may explain the difficulty observed in
getting subjects who are instructed to find the correct
grammar rules actually to do so. These rules may be
unusual enough that they are difficult for subjects to
generate without detailed instruction.
How is rule generation and evaluation performed in
this dual problem space? Lea and Simon (1979) offer
several alternatives. The simplest alternative is to refrain
from any feedback from the evaluation stage to the gener-
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ation stage except to signal rejection when a hypothesis is
disconfirmed by data. Rule generation is then essentially
blind to the detailed data of experiments or instances.
More sophisticated alternatives allow more information
from experiments or instances to inform the generation
process. In concept-formation tasks, Lea and Simon
found that different subjects' behaviors conformed to
different alternatives.
Protocols from Kotovsky and Simon's (1979) series-
completion task provide some indication of what alterna-
tives might underlie subjects' behaviors in implicit learn-
ing tasks. Kotovsky and Simon's protocols showed that
subjects examined the series and discovered periodicities
in the letters. Subjects then developed compact rules to
describe those periodicities. The explicit hypothesis-
testing strategy in grammar-learning experiments might
operate similarly. As subjects observe strings, they may
discover repetitive sequences. Subjects could then at-
tempt to learn those sequences and develop rewrite rules
to describe sequences of those sequences. Unfortunately,
we do not know of any protocol data that examine this
question.
To conclude, subjects performing explicit hypothesis
testing demonstrate in their protocols clear reports of
intermediate hypotheses and a relatively slow time course
of processing. These phenomena stand in contrast to the
obscure and superficial report and relatively fast time
course of processing found in protocols of subjects engaged
in typical implicit learning tasks. Though we have seen no
data, we predict that subjects' behavior in grammar-
learning experiments under explicit hypothesis-testing
instructions will more closely resemble Bruner et al.'s
(1956) and Kotovsky and Simon's (1979) subjects than
subjects working under implicit instructions.
It seems clear, then, that there are two separate learn-
ing strategies available to subjects, and that these strate-
gies can be invoked by differences in the instructions
given to subjects. The rule-induction strategy is charac-
terized by conscious effort to develop and evaluate hy-
potheses that are often unrepresentative of the actual
grammar. This strategy can be invoked by detailed in-
structions and it can be facilitated by sensibly ordered
examples. The "instance" strategy is invoked by instruc-
tions simply to memorize or observe the training strings,
and it does not seem to be affected by the presentation
order of training strings (Reber et al. 1980). Under this
strategy subjects encode the whole strings and their basic
features - such as pairs and triplets. Both strategies
appear to be conscious, but the contents of consciousness
vary. The rule-induction strategy trades in hypotheses
and is well characterized as problem solving, but the
instance strategy trades only in simpler data and seems
well characterized as memorization.
3.3. Models for implicit learning tasks
How do computational models fit with the results we have
discussed? We first consider the computations involved
and then turn to the issue of consciousness.
Artificial grammar research has provided the most
detailed analysis of what types of knowledge are acquired
during implicit learning tasks and what processes use
them at test time. There is memory for whole strings for
recognition and similarity judgments, and substring frag-
ments for piecemeal familiarity judgments. Distributed-
memory models in general and Parallel Distributed Pro-
cessing (PDP) models in particular are well suited to these
knowledge types and tasks. Networks are capable of
learning both types of knowledge simultaneously and in
the same set of weights. Dienes (1992) compared a variety
of distributed- and memory array models on a set of
grammar-learning data and found that an autoassociative
network using the delta rule for learning fit the data best.
The less competitive alternatives were connectionist
models using the Hebb rule, and three memory array
models.
The autoassociative network model consisted of a single
layer of units that were completely interconnected. Each
unit coded for one letter at a particular position in a string.
Accordingly, there were five units (one for each letter) for
each of six string positions. A variety of other local and
distributed encoding schemes were also tested, but no
great qualitative differences were found. The model was
trained on the set of 20 training strings shown to subjects,
and the delta rule (Widrow & Hoff 1960) was used to
change the weights until each training pattern could
reproduce itself over the input units. In one set of simula-
tions, the model was trained on each stimulus the same
number of times as were subjects. Each training trial,
therefore, was equivalent for subjects and for the model.
The model was tested on the grammaticality task by
requiring it to compute a response to each test string. If
the model could correctly reproduce the input with mini-
mal error, the response was called "grammatical." If the
model reproduced the input with a large error, the re-
sponse was called "ungrammatical."
The delta rule model produced a high level of perfor-
mance on the grammaticality test. It also produced the
same ratio of random errors to consistent errors as did
subjects. Critically, its ranking of the grammaticality of
the test strings correlated highly with subjects' rankings.
No other model could produce this correlation.
A somewhat similar account has been proposed for
sequence learning. Cleeremans and McClelland (1991)
developed a simple recurrent network model to simulate
their human sequence-learning data. Since much of the
benefit in reaction times during the sequence task is
presumed to come from predicting the next stimulus, the
model was designed to predict the next stimulus at each
point in the sequence. The input layer of the model
encoded one stimulus of a sequence at a time and used
one unit for each of the possible stimuli in the "grammar"
of stimulus sequences. As the model stepped through a
sequence, the input layer successively encoded each
stimulus in turn. At each step, activation from the input
layer was fed forward through the model to produce
activations in the output layer to represent the model's
prediction about the upcoming stimulus. During train-
ing, the weights between units were adjusted so as to
produce accurate predictions.
The model's behavior corresponded to the human data
in three ways. First, after training, the model performed
at the same level as subjects on the sequence task.
Second, the model learned at the same rate as subjects.
Cleeremans and McClelland drew a correspondence be-
tween single training trials for subjects and single training
trials for the model. The model matched subjects' perfor-
mance throughout the time course of training. Cleere-
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mans and McClelland divided knowledge of the grammar
into sets, depending on how many previous stimuli were
required to make accurate predictions at each point in a
sequence. Like subjects, the model first acquired knowl-
edge allowing it to predict correctly in cases where only
one previous stimulus was important. Both subjects and
the model then slowly acquired the longer, more complex
dependencies.
The third match between subjects and the model was
the length of delay between predicted stimuli and their
predicting context. Cleeremans and McClelland created
a grammar with a set of stimuli that intervened between a
predictive beginning stimulus and a predicted ending
stimulus (e.g., 15553 vs. 25554). For both subjects and the
model, only three intervening stimuli could be tolerated
before the initial stimulus was forgotten.
As discussed above, concept learning also often appears
to be mediated by the conscious memorization of in-
stances. Recently, PDP models have been developed to
simulate human results on these tasks as well (Gluck &
Bower 1988; Kruschke 1992; McClelland & Rumelhart
1985; Shanks & Gluck 1994). These models produce close
quantitative fits to a variety of concept identification,
classification, and recognition data. Like the other PDP
models, they learn in a memorization-like fashion by
encoding individual stimuli and modifying their weights
in response to each stimulus to process that stimulus
better.
What about more fragmentary information? Perruchet
and Pacteau (1990) found that subjects recognized fre-
quent bigrams better than infrequent bigrams. This re-
sult requires some representation of the frequency of
bigrams. An important feature of distributed memories
(Cleeremans & McClelland 1991; Dienes 1992) is that
they produce frequency statistics, in the form of strengths
of encodings, as a by-product of the memorization pro-
cess. Such a process has two good points: it does not
require any covert computations to produce useful knowl-
edge, and the computations it does require - memoriza-
tion - fit with subjects' reportable experience of the
training tasks.
These PDP models, therefore, capture a variety of
data from sequence-learning, grammar-learning, and
concept-learning tasks. Their details differ, but their basic
representational abilities and modes of processing are the
same. In this sense, they provide a unifying mechanism
for learning both whole item and fragment knowledge and
for simulating a wide range of cognitive phenomena from
conditioning to sequence and grammar learning. Cleere-
mans (1993b) discusses at length some of the correspon-
dences between human performance in implicit learning
tasks and the behavior of connectionist models.
These models do not, however, say anything about
consciousness. A standard idea in the psychological litera-
ture is to equate consciousness with the states of a pro-
cessor, rather than with the processes themselves. In a
PDP model, the states are the transitory activations of the
units. "We assume that responses and perhaps the con-
tents of perceptual experience depend on the temporal
integration of the pattern of activation over all of the
nodes" (McClelland & Rumelhart 1981, p. 381). In the
models of instance memorization, these activations en-
code the features of individual stimuli. There is no repre-
sentation within the models of rules or of the testing of
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hypotheses. These representations, therefore, fit well
with the idea that what subjects are doing in implicit
learning tasks is memorizing the stimuli.
The ability to generalize and perform above chance on a
grammaticality task arises from the fact that memorization
takes place in a distributed system, where every memory
contributes to every response. In a connectionist model
such as Dienes's (1992), memorization occurs when the
weights of the network are changed to encode a stimulus.
Similar stimuli produce similar weight changes that es-
tablish strong connections over time, whereas dissimilar
stimuli, or parts of stimuli, produce dissimilar weight
changes that wash out over time. In this way, the central
tendency and underlying structure of a set of stimuli is
slowly captured by the weights. In both the Dienes (1992)
and Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) models, the sys-
tem is fully "aware" of the stimulus on each trial. In the
latter model, the input layer encodes the stimulus one
letter at a time, and that letter is fully activated. The input
layer in Dienes's model encodes an entire string at once.
While the stimulus on each learning trial is fully regis-
tered, the weights of the network start out very weak and
slowly grow stronger with training, as knowledge is ac-
quired. The models say, therefore, that subjects are fully
aware of each stimulus, and that they slowly grow more
aware of the underlying structure of the stimulus set as
the weights grow stronger. But just as awareness of the
structure may be very limited early in training, so will the
extent to which that structure actually controls perfor-
mance: "awareness" and performance will be correlated.
In contrast, connectionist models do not fit well with
our understanding of the explicit hypothesis-testing strat-
egies also found in the grammar-learning literature (sect.
3.2). Lea and Simon (1979) describe a possible mecha-
nism, along the lines of the "general problem solver," to
perform hypothesis testing. This learning strategy is dif-
ferent enough from the memorization strategy in process
and results so that it is not surprising that it calls for a
different sort of mechanism to execute the hypothesis-
testing computations.
4. Learning and amnesia
In our evaluation of learning systems we have not consid-
ered at all the evidence from patients suffering from the
classic anterograde amnesic syndrome (Squire 1992). Be-
cause these patients are generally considered to suffer
from a learning or memory deficit, it is worth considering
briefly how the data from this population relate to the data
from normal subjects.
We know of no convincing data that would suggest that
amnesics are capable of unconscious learning. It is very
important to note that most studies have used episodic
memory tests and hence fail to meet our condition for
inferring unconscious learning from unconscious mem-
ory. For example, amnesic patients show normal or near-
normal responding to a previously conditioned stimulus
although they are apparently unable to recall the condi-
tioning episode (Weiskrantz & Warrington 1979). But this
is an example of case (2) rather than case (3) from section
2.3.1 (Fig. 1) and is therefore insufficient to establish that
learning had been unconscious: that is, subjects may have
been conscious of the reinforcement contingency but
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unable to remember the episode in which it was learned.
The amnesics, if asked, may well have been able to report
a conscious expectancy of the US (unconditioned stim-
ulus) given the CS.
It is true that a number of studies have shown that
amnesics, like normals, can sometimes acquire informa-
tion but be unable to report it verbally. Thus Nissen and
Bullemer (1987; see also Knopman 1991) found that
Korsakoff amnesic patients could speed up on a sequential
RT task but report neither the sequence nor awareness of
the existence of a sequence. However, as our discussion in
section 2 revealed, that subjects are unable to report
verbally some information they can otherwise be shown to
have learned does not prove that the learning was uncon-
scious, and this is as true for amnesics as it is for normal
subjects. Nissen and Bullemer did not use a prediction
test for conscious knowledge, and we know of no other
studies that have attempted to use more sensitive tests of
awareness.
This is not to imply that amnesics' poor performance on
explicit memory tests is due to the insensitivity of such
tests. On the contrary, this is unlikely to be the case
because compared to normals, amnesics appear to be
selectively impaired on explicit tests such as recognition
(but see Ostergaard, 1994, for a contrary view). For
example, Knowlton et al. (1992) reported that amnesics
can perform as well as normals in judging the gram-
maticality of new strings generated from an artificial
grammar while being very poor at recognizing the train-
ing strings. It is hard to see how such dissociations can be
explained by differences in sensitivity between the gram-
maticality and recognition tests, because in that case the
effect should be comparable for normals and amnesics.
Instead, the evidence suggests that amnesics have a
genuine problem with a certain class of memorial experi-
ence (i.e., episodic memory; see Humphreys et al. 1989,
for a relevant computational model). However, there is no
reason to believe that the problem involves awareness at
the time of learning, or more specifically that results from
amnesics provide any evidence for unconscious learning.
With respect to the learning of rules versus instances,
there seems little doubt that amnesics can perform well
(possibly at the same level as normals) in tasks that can be
mastered by learning instances or fragments. Thus, in
addition to Nissen and Bullemer's (1987) demonstration of
learning in a sequential RT task, Knowlton et al.'s (1992)
report of excellent artificial grammar learning in amnesics
suggests that instance or fragment learning is intact. In
contrast, evidence for genuine rule learning is sparse,
which is not surprising given the problems involved in
distinguishing instance from rule learning. Nevertheless,
there is some evidence of conscious rule learning in
amnesia. For example, Wood et al. (1982) report that
although amnesics have some difficulty learning the Fi-
bonacci rule, they are able to do so.
5. Summary
A variety of strategies have been used to assess, more or
less directly, the content of a subjects awareness during a
learning episode. Evidence for implicit learning would
come from (1) demonstrations of learning with subliminal
stimuli, and (2) dissociations between task performance
and measures of awareness such as verbal reports. The
latter dissociations appear at first sight to provide evi-
dence for implicit learning, because the inability to report
the relevant stimulus relationship licenses the inference
that learning may have occurred without awareness.
We have argued that there is little convincing evidence
of learning with subliminal stimuli. On the other hand,
with respect to the unconscious learning of stimulus
relationships, we have documented a number of dissocia-
tions between performance and reports. There are none-
theless two reasons to question whether they establish
implicit learning. First, there may be a relatively uninter-
esting explanation of such dissociations, stemming from
the experimenter's failure to address the Information
Criterion. If learning involves the acquisition of informa-
tion /, but the experimenter is focusing on information /*,
then subjects may appear to be unaware of the relevant
knowledge when in fact they are aware of it. Second, if the
test of reportable knowledge fails to meet the Sensitivity
Criterion, it is impossible to know whether a dissociation
is genuine or merely reflects inadequate sensitivity to
conscious information in the awareness test. Our review
suggests that when attempts are made to use sensitive
tests, dissociations do not emerge. Finally, if one is
unprepared to accept recognition or prediction tests as
measures of conscious knowledge, then it is difficult to see
how the Sensitivity Criterion can ever be met. It is simply
a fact of life that tests of verbal recall tend to be less
sensitive to small amounts of knowledge than other be-
havioral measures. Perhaps alternatives to the simple
dissociation logic adopted in almost all experimental tests
of unconscious learning need to be explored, as they have
in studies of unconscious perception (Reingold & Merikle
1988).
Our evaluation of the results that have emerged is
similar to Holender's (1986) conclusion in this journal
concerning unconscious semantic activation. Although
there are some interesting pieces of evidence, a cautious
approach would suggest that unconscious learning has not
yet been satisfactorily established. Instead, there is sub-
stantial evidence for more than one conscious learning
strategy and knowledge type. People certainly can learn
and use rules, and they can also memorize instances and
fragments. Researchers have begun to identify the factors
(e.g., study time, stimulus properties) that are conducive
to rule learning and instance learning.
Proponents of implicit learning, which is hypothesized
to involve the unconscious learning of rules, have failed to
demonstrate that it accurately describes a class of human
learning abilities. On the contrary, human learning is
almost invariably accompanied by conscious awareness,
and in tasks such as artificial grammar learning, where
learning is frequently thought to involve rule abstraction,
performance is most often based on the acquisition of
instances or fragments from the training stage.
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NOTES
1. The mere exposure effect may provide a paradoxical exam-
ple of how instructions that seem to encourage the subject to
rely on available conscious knowledge can result in their doing
so to a lesser degree than instructions for a performance task.
Several well-known studies (e.g., Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 1980;
see Bornstein 1992, for a review) have given subjects very brief
presentations of geometrical figures prior to testing them with
pairs of stimuli consisting of one old and one new figure. For
each pair, the subjects had to indicate which one was old and
which one was preferred. Results indicate that subjects will
choose the old stimulus for their preference judgment although
their ability to discriminate old from new stimuli in the recogni-
tion test is at or close to chance. On the face of it, this provides a
powerful dissociation between results obtained from closely
matched performance (preference) and awareness (recognition)
tests. Ignoring the possibility that the procedure may fail to
meet the requirement for inferring unconscious learning from
unconscious memory (sect. 2.3.1), we suggest that the result is
still not evidence for unconscious learning because, relative to
the preference test, the recognition test may encourage subjects
to discount deliberately a conscious source of information (viz.,
stimulus familiarity), because they know that familiarity can be a
poor index of whether a stimulus has recently been seen.
Evidence for this interpretation comes from a recent experi-
ment by Merikle and Reingold (1991), who found that as testing
continued, the recognition test gradually became more sensi-
tive to the old/new distinction than the preference test (i.e.,
hypermnesia occurred). This result is consistent with the idea
that subjects began to rely on familiarity in making their recog-
nition judgments because they realized that when they dis-
counted it, they had no other cues on which to base their
recognition decision.
2. A possible empirical way to determine whether uncon-
scious influences do play a role would be to adopt Jacoby's (1991)
process dissociation technique of asking subjects to provide
letter continuations but to avoid any continuation that they had
seen in the study phase. If some studied continuations were
given, that would indicate the presence of unconscious in-
fluences.
3. The prediction task bears a striking but presumably unin-
tentional resemblance to the task used by the parapsychologist
Schmidt (1969) in his tests of precognition. In Schmidt's experi-
ments, target selection on each trial was determined by random
particle emission from a strontium-90 source, yet subjects were
apparently able to predict at better-than-chance levels where
each target would appear! In our discussion of data from the
prediction task, we ignore the rather distressing possibility that
subjects' performance may be influenced by such precognitive
abilities.
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